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Flood Money:  The Challenge of U.S. Flood 
Insurance Reform in a Warming World 
 
 
Jennifer Wriggins* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Congress’s reforms of the National Flood Insurance Program 
(“NFIP”) in 2014 continued its misguided approach to flood insurance 
policy, ignoring the increased risks of floods posed by climate change 
and giving generous subsidies to flood-prone properties.  The Article 
analyzes the recent reforms against a backdrop of the NFIP’s history, 
impacts, and structure, and makes recommendations for steps Congress 
should take when it revisits the program in 2017.  The NFIP has 
encouraged retention of older flood-prone properties and building in 
flood-prone areas, which makes little sense given the risks we face.  The 
NFIP, deeply in debt to the Treasury Department, rests in part on an 
approach to flood risk where risks are pooled but what individuals pay is 
often not based on actual flood risk.  This solidaristic approach to flood 
risk, where the government subsidizes hundreds of thousands of flood 
policies, is not based on need or any other credible policy principle.   
Further, the justifications for continuing the subsidies are weak 
when compared to other contexts where the federal government has been 
involved in solidaristic approaches to insurance such as the Affordable 
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Care Act, unemployment insurance, and promoting insurance in urban 
areas.  Congress should gradually remove flood insurance subsidies, fund 
accurate maps, and allow rates to be based on risk.  Because flood 
insurance is mandatory for mortgage-holders in flood-prone areas, and 
risk-based rates may be overly harsh for low-income homeowners, a 
limited means-tested program should be passed which would allow these 
homeowners to receive insurance at reduced rates. 
 
 
Table of Contents 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 364 
I.  FEDERAL FLOOD POLICY AND FLOOD INSURANCE:  BACKGROUND, 
BASICS, AND EVOLUTION ..................................................................... 372 
A.   Background and Basics ................................................................ 372 
1.  Origins of Federal Involvement with Floods:  Mississippi 
Flooding ....................................................................................... 372 
2.   Flood Insurance Program Origins:  A Market Void, the 
Great Society, and a Drive Towards Implementation ............ 373 
3.  The Flood Act’s Broad Goals for the National Flood 
Insurance Program ................................................................. 375 
4.    The Basic Framework .......................................................... 376 
B.  Evolution of the National Flood Insurance Program from 
1968-2012 .................................................................................... 377 
1.  Community Participation ....................................................... 377 
2.  Expanded Subsidies .............................................................. 378 
3.  Repeated Bailouts .................................................................. 379 
4.   Purchase Mandates in High-Risk Zones ................................ 380 
5.  Mapping and Rate-Setting ..................................................... 380 
6.  Sale by Private Companies:  The “Write-Your-Own” 
Program .................................................................................. 380 
7.  Floodplain Management and Flood Mitigation ...................... 381 
8.   Relationship to Federal Disaster Relief .................................. 382 
9.  The NFIP in 2012 ................................................................... 383 
II.    FEDERAL FLOOD INSURANCE POLICY:  ASSESSMENT OF THE 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM PRIOR TO THE 2012 AND 
2014 REFORMS ..................................................................................... 384 
A.   The National Flood Insurance Program’s Conflicting and 
Unattainable Goals ....................................................................... 384 
B.  The Difficulty of Insuring Flood Risk at an Inexpensive Price .... 386 
1.  Supply Side ........................................................................... 386 
a.  Correlated and Ambiguous Risk ..................................... 386 
b.  Adverse Selection ........................................................... 387 
c.  Moral Hazard .................................................................. 388 
d. Information and Mapping ............................................... 389 
2.  Demand Side:  Cognitive Biases and Disaster Relief ............ 390 
WRIGGINS FINAL [SEND TO PRINT] (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  3:26 PM 
2014] FLOOD MONEY 363 
C.  Unintended Consequences:  Development in Flood-Prone 
Areas and Incentives to Not Renovate Older Homes ................... 393 
D.  Problematic Mapping and a Confusing Structure ........................ 396 
E.  The Situation in 2012 ................................................................... 396 
III.   THE 2012 AND 2014 REFORMS.............................................................. 397 
A.   The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 .......... 397 
1.   Highlights of the 2012 Reforms ............................................. 399 
a.  Eventual Subsidy Elimination, Risk-Based Rates, and 
an Actuarial Approach .................................................... 399 
b.   “Affordability” Study ..................................................... 400 
c.  Improving Mapping and Grounding Maps in Science .... 401 
d.  Other BW-12 Reforms .................................................... 402 
2.   Summary of the 2012 Reforms .............................................. 403 
B.  The Menendez-Grimm Homeowner Flood Insurance 
Affordability Act of 2014 ............................................................ 403 
1.  Highlights of the 2014 Reforms ............................................. 404 
a.  “Striving” to Limit Premium Prices................................ 404 
b. Subsidies:  Reinstatement of Some and Continuing 
Gradual Elimination of Others ........................................ 404 
i.  Some Subsidies Are Reinstated and a Surcharge 
is Added to All Policies. ........................................... 404 
ii.  Subsidies Remain when Subsidized Properties 
Are Sold and  when Subsidized Policies Have 
Lapsed. .................................................................... 405 
iii.   Gradual Subsidy Elimination for Second Homes, 
Businesses, and Severe Repetitive Loss 
Properties Will Continue. ........................................ 406 
c.   “Affordability” Study Expanded .................................... 406 
d.  More Congressional Oversight Added for Mapping ...... 408 
e.  New Flood Insurance Advocate Position Created .......... 408 
f.  Variety in Policies and Clear Communication 
Encouraged ..................................................................... 408 
2.  Summary of 2014 Reforms .................................................... 409 
C.  Lessons of Failed Reforms ........................................................... 410 
1.  Why the 2012 Reforms Passed .............................................. 410 
a.  Direct Response to Criticism and Reflection of 
Popular Market-Based Approach ................................... 410 
b.  Effective Advocacy by a Diverse Coalition of Groups... 411 
c.  Inattentiveness of Potentially Affected Parties ............... 411 
d.  Lack of Major Recent Storms or Floods ......................... 412 
e.  The Popularity of Fiscal Stability as a Goal ................... 412 
2.  Why the 2012 Reforms Were Reformed in 2014 ................... 413 
a.  Intense Lobbying and Pressure from the Real Estate 
Industry and Affected People and Groups ...................... 413 
b.  Powerful Individual Narratives and Superficial Press 
Attention ......................................................................... 415 
WRIGGINS FINAL [SEND TO PRINT] (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  3:26 PM 
364 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:2 
c.  Common Human Response to Floods and Climate 
Change as Predicted by Behavioral Economics .............. 418 
d.  FEMA’s Difficult Situation, Weak Communication, 
and Response .................................................................. 419 
e.  Summary of Reforms and Retreat .................................. 420 
IV.    ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONGRESS IN 2017 .............. 421 
A.  Flood Risk Mapping:  Mapping Should Be Protected from 
Political Influence. ....................................................................... 421 
B.  Subsidies:  The Remaining General Subsidies Should 
Gradually Be Phased Out. ............................................................ 423 
1.  The Incentives Created by the Current Subsidies Make No 
Sense, Particularly Given Climate Change Risks. ........................ 424 
2.   The Justification for Subsidies and the Current Solidaristic 
Approach to Flood Insurance is Weaker Than in Other 
Contexts Where the Federal Government Has Been 
Involved in Insurance. ............................................................ 425 
a.  Federal Reinsurance for Riots:  Fair Access to 
Insurance Requirements Plans ........................................ 425 
b.  Federal Unemployment Insurance .................................. 427 
c. Affordable Care Act ....................................................... 428 
3.   Accurate Maps and Risk-Based Rates May Bring More 
Private Competition and State Insurance Regulation 
Which Overall Will Be Positive. ............................................ 429 
C.  Affordability:  Congress Should Pass an “Affordability” Plan, 
But It Should Be Limited and Targeted Towards the Needy. ...... 430 
D.  Congress Should Pass a Framework to Deal with the Long-
Term Effects of Climate Change. ................................................. 435 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 436 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, Congress responded to decades of criticism of the National 
Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”), which supplies flood insurance to 
homeowners, and passed substantial reforms by a large bipartisan 
majority.1  Huge general subsidies for the highest risk properties2 and 
massive storms3 led to a debt of $24 billion that the NFIP owed the 
 
 1.  The 2012 reforms were known as the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform 
Act of 2012 (BW-12), Pub. L. No. 112-141, §§ 100201–100249, 126 Stat. 405, 916–69 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4130 (2012)).  Criticisms have centered on the program’s 
deficits, subsidies, environmental effects, incentives, costs, rate-making, communication, 
and mapping.  See infra Part II.   
 2.  See infra Part I.A.4 and Part I.B.2.    
 3.  Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Hurricane Ike in 2008, and subsequent storms such 
as Superstorm Sandy have led to very high flood losses.  See HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER & 
ERWANN O. MICHEL-KERJAN, AT WAR WITH THE WEATHER: MANAGING LARGE-SCALE 
RISKS IN A NEW ERA OF CATASTROPHE 4–10 (2011) (showing hurricane costs prior to 
WRIGGINS FINAL [SEND TO PRINT] (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  3:26 PM 
2014] FLOOD MONEY 365 
Treasury Department.4  In the 2012 reforms, Congress moved away from 
the solidaristic approach to flood risk5 that it had used for almost five 
decades, which generously subsidized premiums for the highest risk 
properties, to an actuarial approach in which premiums eventually would 
be based on a house’s actual flood risk.6  Congress also made other 
 
Sandy); Don Jergler, EQECAT: Colorado Floods $2B in Economic Losses and Climbing, 
INS. J. (Sept. 20, 2013), http://insurancejournal.com/news/west/2013/09/20/305896.htm 
(reporting that the catastrophe modeling firm known as EQECAT estimates $50 billion in 
losses from Superstorm Sandy, much of which was insured, and $2 billion from early 
September 2013 Colorado floods, only a tiny fraction of which was insured); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-607, FLOOD INSURANCE: MORE INFORMATION NEEDED 
ON SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES 2 n.2 (2013) [hereinafter GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES 
REPORT] (noting that losses from Superstorm Sandy led to increasing FEMA’s borrowing 
limit in January 2013).  The response to Katrina highlighted with stunning force some of 
the shortcomings of U.S. flood policy.  Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: 
Governmental and Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV.  3, 7 (2007) 
(outlining how the events of Katrina were precisely predicted well in advance but the 
response prepared in advance was wholly inadequate).  The literature on Hurricane 
Katrina is too vast to summarize here.  See generally ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS 
FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 109 (Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettle & Howard C. 
Kunreuther eds., 2006) [hereinafter ON RISK AND DISASTER].  The insurance litigation 
brought by homeowners to recover some of their losses from Hurricane Katrina 
showcased some of the challenges and failures of U.S. flood insurance and U.S. private 
insurance.  After Hurricane Katrina, it was revealed that many people who should have 
had insurance both for flood and other risks did not have it.  Donald T. Hornstein, The 
Balkanization of CAT Property Insurance: Financing and Fragmentation in Storm Risks, 
11 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 7–8 (2013); Charlene Luke & Aviva Abramovsky, 
Managing the Next Deluge: A Tax System Approach to Flood Insurance, 18 CONN. INS. 
L.J. 1, 11 n.48 (2011); Scales, supra, at 14.  Further, many homeowners litigated the 
‘concurrent cause provisions’ in their policies, which provided that if a covered cause 
(wind) combined with an excluded cause (flood) to cause loss to a homeowner, the entire 
loss was not covered.  These clauses, which often resulted in homeowners having 
minimal or nonexistent coverage, were upheld by the Fifth Circuit.  Hornstein, supra, at 
12–14.   
 4.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-127, FLOOD INSURANCE: 
STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT 1 (2014) [hereinafter GAO, 
2014 PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT REPORT].  
 5.  See JOHN O’NEILL & MARTIN O’NEILL, JOSEPH ROWNTREE FOUND., SOCIAL 
JUSTICE AND THE FUTURE OF FLOOD INSURANCE (2012), available at 
http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/vulnerable-households-flood-insurance-summary.pdf 
(explaining solidaristic and actuarial concepts of insurance; a solidaristic approach 
involves risk pooling with payment into the pool in accordance with an agreed upon 
arrangement usually based on a concept of equity or need; actuarial approach also 
involves risk pooling but payments into the pool are based on the best estimate of the 
individual’s risk).  See generally TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW & POLICY 12–15, 21 
(2012) (discussing a solidaristic concept of insurance and the relationship between 
insurance and social responsibility); KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: 
INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986).  
 6.  An actuarial approach to insurance requires that individuals “bear the costs of 
their own risks when you align the costs they face with their associated level of risk.”  
O’NEILL & O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 6.  
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changes, such as supplying more funds for making accurate maps.7  The 
reforms meant that rates of homeowners with properties at high risk of 
flood would, in some cases, rise substantially over time.  Faced with the 
resulting furor over rising rates, in March 2014 Congress reversed many 
of the reforms by a large bipartisan majority.8  Congress largely 
reinstituted its prior solidaristic approach of huge general subsidies to 
high-risk properties while making other changes.9  In 2017, Congress 
must revisit the NFIP.10  This Article analyzes this extraordinary saga, 
which raises basic issues of governance, risk, the federal government’s 
role, and climate change.11  Congress has an opportunity to learn from 
the debacle of the failed reforms, and this Article draws lessons from the 
reform failure and makes recommendations for steps Congress should 
take in 2017.12 
Floods, both coastal and riverine, are the most costly form of natural 
disaster in the United States.13  Floods from rain in Colorado in 2013 and 
from Superstorm Sandy in 2012 resulted in massive human and financial 
losses.14  Floods are likely to get much more frequent, severe, and 
expensive in the coming decades due to the effects of climate change and 
population growth.15  Floods and their costs create huge, interlocking 
 
 7.  Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12), Pub. L. No. 112-
141, §§ 100201–100249, 126 Stat. 405, 916–69 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4130 
(2012)).  See generally Questions About the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act 
of 2012, FEMA.GOV, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1912-25045-
9380/bw12_qa_04_2013.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2014) [hereinafter FEMA 2012 
Overview]; Summary of Biggert-Waters Act of 2012, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS,  
http://www.naic.org/documents/cipr_events_2012_cipr_summit_overview.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2014) [hereinafter NAIC Overview]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-06-497T, GAO’S HIGH-RISK PROGRAM 7 (2006) [hereinafter GAO, 2006 
FLOOD INSURANCE HIGH-RISK REPORT] (outlining fiscal issues with flood program).   
 8.  Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, §§ 
3–4, 128 Stat. 1020, 1021–22 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4014(g), 4015).   
 9.  See infra Part III.B.  
 10.  § 100203(b), 126 Stat. at 916 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4026). 
 11.  See infra Parts I–III.  
 12.  See infra Part IV.  
 13.  Flood Insurance, INS. INFO. INST. (July 2014), 
http://www.iii.org/issues_updates/flood-insurance.html [hereinafter INS. INFO. INST., 
Flood Insurance].  
 14.  See, e.g., Jergler, supra note 3 (estimating Superstorm Sandy and Colorado 
flooding costs). 
 15.  See generally, e.g., FED. EMERGENCY MGMT AGENCY, 2011-OPPA-01, 
ADMINISTRATOR POLICY, FEMA CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION POLICY STATEMENT 
(2011) [hereinafter FEMA CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION STATEMENT] (outlining the 
agency-wide directive to integrate climate change adaptation planning, including 
planning for more intense storms, extreme flooding, and higher sea levels in its 
processes); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-359T, GAO’S 2013 HIGH-
RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE (2013) [hereinafter, GAO, MANAGING CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS] 
(adding to the GAO’s high-risk list the following:  “Limiting the Federal Government’s 
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public policy and governance issues, many of which have questions of 
risk and insurance at their core.  Floods in populated areas raise thorny, 
enduring questions about the roles of many actors, including 
governments at all levels, the private insurance industry, and individuals, 
in paying for flood losses and preventing future losses.16 
Compensation of flood losses in the past century has largely come 
from the federal government in the form of disaster relief and, since 
1968, in the form of flood insurance supplied by the federal 
government.17  Among industrialized nations, the United States alone 
bears all the underwriting risk of these policies.18  At the same time, land 
use planning has been largely a local and state governmental concern.19  
Private insurance has rarely insured for homeowners’ risk of flood for 
more than 50 years.20  Dilemmas concerning what to do about flooding 
and insurance are international in scope.21  The general subsidies, costs, 
 
Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks”); AECOM, THE IMPACT OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND POPULATION GROWTH ON THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
PROGRAM THROUGH 2100 (2013).  
 16.  See infra Part I.A.  Debates about the federal government’s role in connection 
with floods stretch back to the nineteenth century.  DAVID MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: 
GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 258–62 (2001).  See generally JAMES M. 
WRIGHT, ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, THE NATION’S RESPONSES TO FLOOD 
DISASTERS: A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT (Wendy L. Hessler ed., 2000) [hereinafter THE 
NATION’S RESPONSES] (providing a historical review of governmental responses to 
floods).  
 17.  Scales, supra note 3, at 7; GAO, 2006 FLOOD INSURANCE HIGH RISK-REPORT, 
supra note 7, at 7. 
 18.  INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13. 
 19.  Scales, supra note 3, at 12. 
 20.  MOSS, supra note 16, at 262 (explaining that private insurance companies 
discontinued selling flood insurance by the end of 1928); Luke & Abramovsky, supra 
note 3, at 22 (highlighting the absence of a private market for homeowners flood 
insurance); GAO, 2006 FLOOD INSURANCE HIGH-RISK REPORT, supra note 7, at 7 
(highlighting the absence of a private market for homeowners flood insurance).  While 
standard homeowners policies exclude flood, generally they cover damage from wind.  
However, this wind coverage is being “hollowed out” by policy language, large 
deductibles, and in some cases insurers deciding not to cover wind.  The most well 
known examples are the now-standard concurrent causation clauses, which provide that if 
wind damage combines with water damage, the entire loss is uncovered.  These clauses 
were upheld after Hurricane Katrina in extensive litigation, which was resolved by the 
Fifth Circuit.  Hornstein, supra note 3, at 6–12.  This has led some states to develop 
windstorm insurance plans, which, along with state hurricane insurance plans, this Article 
does not discuss in detail.  See infra Part IV.C.  See generally KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-
KERJAN, supra note 3.   
 21.  Climate change and population growth are leading to more and increasingly 
costly floods in many parts of the world.  See THE WORLD BANK, NATURAL HAZARDS, 
UNNATURAL DISASTERS 169–86 (2010); THOMAS F. STOCKER ET AL., 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013, at 50 (2013), 
available at 
http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf.  The 
Geneva Association, an international think tank for the insurance industry, considers 
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rate-making, and environmental effects of the NFIP have long been 
widely criticized,22 and reforms have periodically been made.23  Despite 
criticisms of federal flood policies and suspicion of the federal 
government, when a flood strikes, officials, communities, and individuals 
in flood-stricken communities routinely rely on federal aid.24 
 
climate risk serious and warns that ocean warming may lead to much more severe storm 
losses which may overwhelm traditional catastrophe models if adequate mitigation is not 
performed in advance.  FALK NIEHÖRSTER, GENEVA ASS’N, WARMING OF THE OCEANS 
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE (RE)INSURANCE INDUSTRY 3 (2013), available at 
https://www.genevaassociation.org/media/616661/ga2013-warming_of_the_oceans.pdf; 
see also sources cited supra note 15.  Currently the United Kingdom, Canada, and many 
other countries are struggling with what to do about flooding and insurance.  The UK is 
considering a plan known as “Flood Re,” which will involve a surcharge on all policies in 
order to cover floods, a policy known as “bundling,” since old models have not proven 
workable.  Tim Ross, Everyone Faces Higher Bills for Flood Insurance, TELEGRAPH 
(Aug. 23, 2013, 10:00 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/topics/weather/10263654/Everyone-faces-higher-bills-for-
flood-insurance.html; The Future of Flood Insurance: What Happens Next, ASS’N 
BRITISH INSURERS, https://www.abi.org.uk/News/News-
releases/2013/06/~/link.aspx?_id=E483D07DA3BD43BDB730A671A1C853CA&_z=z 
(last updated July 17, 2014).  Canada historically has regarded flood risks as uninsurable, 
and households have not been able to purchase flood insurance.  Canadian P & C 
Industry Researching the Possibility of Offering Overland Flood Insurance, CLAIMS 
CANADA (Oct. 2010), 
http://www.claimscanada.ca/issues/article.aspx?aid=1000390323&er=NA.  The Calgary 
floods of 2012 resulted in pressure on insurance companies and government to cover 
losses.  Jacqueline Nelson, Insurance Brands Feel Force of Floods, GLOBEADVISOR.COM 
(July 17, 2013), 
http://www.globeadvisor.com/servlet/ArticleNews/story/gam/20130717/RBINSURERSH
AME0716ATL.  See also Peter Hannam, Flood Cover Rises to Unaffordable Levels, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.smh.com.au/environment/water-
issues/flood-cover-rises-to-unaffordable-levels-20130216-2ejvb.html (discussing flood 
insurance issues in Australia).   
 22.  See infra Parts II, III; see, e.g., GAO, 2006 FLOOD INSURANCE HIGH RISK-
REPORT, supra note 7, at 5; John Tierney, Op-Ed, Ben Franklin Had the Right Idea for 
New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/03/opinion/03tierney.html; Judith Kildow & Jason 
Scorse, Op-ed, End Federal Flood Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/opinion/end-federal-flood-insurance.html.  
 23. See infra Parts I and II; see, e.g., Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance 
Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-264, 118 Stat. 712 (codified at 42. U.S.C. § 4001 
(2006)) (amended 2012).  See generally Rachel Lisotta, Comment, In Over Our Heads: 
The Inefficiencies of the National Flood Insurance Program and the Institution of 
Federal Tax Incentives, 10 LOY. MAR. L.J. 511, 517–524 (2012) (summarizing reforms 
prior to 2012). 
 24.  See William P. Marshall, National Healthcare and American Constitutional 
Culture, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 144–147 (2012) (highlighting particularly 
American distrust of government).  Federal disaster aid is triggered by presidential 
disaster declarations under the Stafford Act.  Gregory J. Lake, Federal and State Disaster 
Response: An Introduction, 41 COLO. LAW. 95, 95 (2012).  Federal disaster aid 
declarations are more common in presidential election years than in off-years.  
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 122–126. 
WRIGGINS FINAL [SEND TO PRINT] (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  3:26 PM 
2014] FLOOD MONEY 369 
Flooding and the losses it creates present perplexing public policy 
dilemmas, which are likely to become even more vexing in the future.  
Flood losses raise difficult public policy issues for at least three reasons.  
First, flood losses are a problem that all individuals, except the very 
wealthy, generally cannot manage on their own; if a home is destroyed 
by flood, resources from insurance, government, or some other source 
are needed if homeowners are to rebuild.  Second, the complex, varied 
nature of flood risks makes them particularly challenging from a public 
policy point of view.  For example, flood risk varies radically between 
and within different regions.  Further, flood risks are in no one’s 
individual control.25  Yet the amount of damages caused by floods also 
depends significantly on how properties are constructed, as well as where 
they are located.26  Thus, the risks are partly within individuals’ control 
and partly beyond it.27  Moreover, flood risks change over time and 
require expensive mapping to predict.28  Third, when there is an actual 
flood, the losses in a particular area are likely to be astronomical; flood 
risks are characterized as “correlated risks” because they lead to very 
widespread losses from the same hazard.  This potential for extensive 
loss makes it very difficult for private companies to profitably sell flood 
insurance.29 
Two recent developments from outside the field of insurance may 
help with the public policy challenges of flood insurance.  First, newly 
 
 25.  The risks of increased severe weather and sea level rise linked with climate 
change have been widely publicized.  E.g., FEMA CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
STATEMENT, supra note 15.  Some people choose to subject themselves to those risks by 
buying property in flood-prone areas; others may lack the resources to move, raising 
questions about whether living in a flood prone location is a true choice.  See generally 
Kathleen Tierney, Social Inequality. Hazards, and Disasters, in ON RISK AND DISASTER, 
supra note 3, at 109.  For further discussion, see infra Part IV.  
 26.   U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-429T, FLOOD INSURANCE: 
PUBLIC POLICY GOALS PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM 8 (2011) [hereinafter GAO, 
2011 PUBLIC POLICY GOALS REPORT] (describing FEMA mitigation efforts and stating 
that 30,000 properties had been mitigated using FEMA funds between fiscal years 1997 
through fiscal year 2007); INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13 (citing 
research that buildings constructed to NFIP standards suffer about a fifth of the damage 
annually of buildings not constructed to such standards). 
 27.  See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 19–20 (using an example of a group of 
people who are more at risk of certain harm and yet may take some precautions against it, 
to illustrate complexity of risk classification issues).  
 28.  E.g., FEMA CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION STATEMENT, supra note 15.   
 29.  See infra Part II.B (explaining supply and demand side issues connected to flood 
insurance); HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER, MARK V. PAULY & STACEY MCMORROW, 
INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: IMPROVING DECISIONS IN THE MOST 
MISUNDERSTOOD INDUSTRY 83–88 (2013) [hereinafter INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS] (explaining effects of correlated risks on insurance supply); Scales, supra 
note 3, at 11 (explaining how floods lead to correlated losses, in contrast to other casualty 
losses such as fire and auto accidents, which tend to be uncorrelated).  
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developed mapping technology will permit a much more nuanced 
analysis and dissemination of information about flood risk than was 
possible in the past.30  Second, research on how humans evaluate risk and 
make decisions has burgeoned during the past few decades.  This 
research, falling broadly under the rubric of behavioral economics, has 
shown that the decision-making behavior of individuals differs in 
significant ways from the model predicted by classical economics.31  By 
recognizing how human behavior concerning risk differs from traditional 
models, this research bears directly on insurance and insurance law and 
helps explain some of the otherwise puzzling human behavior 
concerning flood insurance.32  With improved mapping data and greater 
understanding of how humans make decisions, flood insurance and 
policy may be improved. 
Governments understandably become involved with floods, flood 
risks, and flood costs, but there are no simple economic, political, or 
legal responses.33  The dilemma of the federal government’s role 
stretches back more than a century.34  It has become a political necessity 
for the federal government to supply billions of dollars in disaster relief 
annually, although it was not so 100 years ago.35 
When government gets involved with insurance, it can take an 
approach that is solidaristic, actuarial, or a combination of the two.  A 
solidaristic approach to insurance is one where risks are pooled, but the 
amount an individual pays is not closely tied to the amount of risk faced 
by the particular individual.36  The NFIP was based in significant part on 
 
 30.  See, e.g., Levees and the National Flood Insurance Program, NAT’L ACAD. 
SCIS. (2012), http://nas-sites.org/levees/report-summary/ [hereinafter NAT’L ACAD. OF 
SCIS., Levee Report]; Dave Owen, Mapping, Modeling, and the Fragmentation of 
Environmental Law, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 219 (explaining how mapping technology can 
improve environmental law). 
 31.  Works popularizing this research include RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 
(2008) and DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).    
 32.  See infra Part II.B.2.  
 33.  See generally Michael J. Trebilcock and Ronald J. Daniels, Rationales and 
Instruments for Government Intervention in Natural Disasters, in ON RISK AND 
DISASTER, supra note 3, at 89–94 (outlining divergent normative perspectives—
libertarian, corrective justice, economic efficiency, distributive justice, communitarian—
on both the justifications for governmental intervention in natural disasters and the means 
that might be used for government to intervene and concluding there are no unitary 
answers); Craig Brown & Sara Seck, Insurance Law Principles in an International 
Context: Compensating Losses Caused by Climate Change, 50 ALBERTA L. REV. 541, 
541–76 (2013) (asserting that there are no probable international solutions to compensate 
losses caused by climate change). 
 34.  THE NATION’S RESPONSES, supra note 16, at 7.      
 35.  MOSS, supra note 16, at 258–262.  
 36.  O’NEILL & O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 7. 
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a solidaristic approach.37  Solidaristic approaches to insurance are often 
used when a particular policy need for broad coverage is considered 
compelling, such as Britain’s or Canada’s National Health Service.38  
The solidaristic approach contrasts with an actuarial approach, in which 
risks are also pooled, but the amount people pay is based on the best 
estimates of the risks faced by the individual.39  Private insurance 
companies in a functioning market take an actuarial approach.40 
Federal flood policy should respond to the growing challenge of 
more frequent and destructive flooding.  Yet bipartisan majorities have 
moved the NFIP in opposite directions in the past two years, first 
reforming it in 2012 and then repealing many of those reforms in 2014.  
This Article explains how the NFIP started and evolved, how it has 
worked, why it is proving so difficult to reform, and how it should be 
changed when Congress takes up the issue of flood insurance in 2017. 
Part I outlines federal flood policy, highlighting the solidaristic 
approach to flood risk which has focused on providing heavily 
subsidized flood insurance to risky properties and has resulted in the 
NFIP’s current deficit of $24 billion.  Part I also outlines the NFIP, 
including its evolution, goals, subsidies, bailouts, and the relationships 
between floodplain management, disaster relief, and flood insurance.  
Part II assesses the NFIP prior to the 2012 reforms, showing how its 
goals conflicted—while the reform aimed to save the federal government 
money by reducing the amount of property at risk of floods, it also had a 
goal of providing flood insurance on “reasonable terms and conditions” 
to people who could otherwise not acquire it.  Part II also sketches the 
many challenges of insuring flood risk, from both a supply and demand 
perspective, and highlights insights from behavioral economics that help 
explain why demand is so low even though the price is far below cost.  
Part II also outlines consequences of the NFIP, including increased 
development in flood-prone areas, incentives to not renovate older 
properties, and enduring deficits.  Part III explains the reforms of 2012 
and 2014, explaining how and why the move towards risk-based 
actuarial rates and away from solidaristic “affordability” concerns begun 
by Congress in 2012 was largely undone in 2014.  Part IV offers 
recommendations to Congress, suggesting that further continuing the 
general subsidies to risky properties, coupled with the incentives these 
subsidies create, is unjustifiable, particularly given climate change.  The 
case for continuing broad subsidies in this context is much weaker than 
 
 37.  See infra Parts I.A.4, I.B.2.  
 38.  O’NEILL & O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 7.  With these national health programs, 
the coverage is funded through tax revenues rather than premiums.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 6. 
 40.  Id.  
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other contexts where the federal government has been involved with 
insurance, such as federal unemployment insurance, urban property 
insurance, and the Affordable Care Act.  Given the weak case for 
subsidies and their negative consequences, Congress should gradually 
phase out the general subsidies and require that rates be based on risk.  
At the same time, the fact that flood insurance is mandatory for 
mortgage-holders suggests that an affordability plan is needed; Congress 
should adopt a narrow means-tested program for the truly needy.  
Further, although it is extremely unlikely, Congress should pass a 
comprehensive framework to deal with the long-term effects of climate 
change.  Fixing the flood program, by contrast, is a realistic goal.  If 
mapping of flood risk is protected from political influence, rates are 
gradually adjusted to reflect flood risk, and a carefully targeted 
affordability plan is included, U.S. flood insurance policy will be 
substantially improved. 
I. FEDERAL FLOOD POLICY AND FLOOD INSURANCE:  BACKGROUND, 
BASICS, AND EVOLUTION 
A.   Background and Basics 
How and why did the federal government become so deeply 
involved in floods and homeowners’ flood insurance?  This section 
outlines the historical trajectory, basics, and evolution of the NFIP since 
its inception in 1968.  The historical trajectory begins with flood control, 
leads to disaster relief, and then reaches insurance. 
1.  Origins of Federal Involvement with Floods:  Mississippi  
 Flooding 
The federal government’s involvement in flooding began in the 
nineteenth century in connection with periodic inundation of the 
Mississippi Delta.41  Locally constructed levees eventually proved 
inadequate to protect the growing agricultural communities from 
recurrent floods, and as the century wore on, pressure built on Congress 
to develop coordinated flood control.42  Starting in 1917, many federal 
flood control acts were passed, authorizing levee construction and other 
measures aimed at controlling floodwaters.43  Federal disaster aid began 
in 1927 when a huge flood along 2000 miles of the Mississippi 
 
 41.  THE NATION’S RESPONSES, supra note 16, at 4–5.   
 42.  Id. at 6; see Mark C. Niles, Punctuated Equilibrium: A Model for Administrative 
Evolution, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 353, 392–403 (2011) (analyzing impact of 1927 
Mississippi flood).  
 43.  THE NATION’S RESPONSES, supra note 16, at 7–12; Scales, supra note 3, at 6.   
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devastated multiple communities.44  After 1927, citizens and politicians 
increasingly expected disaster relief payments from the federal 
government, and payment size grew as population growth, development 
in flood-prone areas, and floods continued.45 
2.   Flood Insurance Program Origins:  A Market Void, the Great  
 Society, and a Drive Towards Implementation 
Insurance came into the picture with the National Flood Insurance 
Act of 1968 (the “Flood Act”), which created the NFIP.  Concern about 
the growing costs of disaster relief, the lack of private insurance 
availability, and development in flood-prone areas led to the Flood Act 
and later revisions.46 
The Flood Act was passed as part of the Housing and Urban 
Development Act of 1968 (“HUD Act”), a fact that is seldom noted.47  
The HUD Act provided not only for the NFIP but also for urban property 
protection and reinsurance.48  Rural interests that wanted flood insurance 
(mostly for river flooding at that time) came together with urban interests 
that wanted relief from losses to property caused by recent riots; without 
both these interests, the NFIP likely would not have come into 
existence.49 
It is worth reflecting on why the federal government would be 
involved in property insurance for individual homeowners.  After all, in 
the United States, we have a robust private insurance industry that 
insures losses to property and an oft-stated preference for markets.50  
When homes are mortgaged, lenders require that homeowners purchase 
property insurance covering risks to their homes; the vast majority of 
homeowners now have this coverage.51  Yet, private homeowners 
 
 44.  MOSS, supra note 16, at 258; Scales, supra note 3, at 7; Niles, supra note 42.     
 45.  MOSS, supra note 16, at 258–262.  
 46.     While the insurance industry had opposed prior acts with a similar purpose in 
the 1950s, in 1968 the industry supported the proposal.  Id. at 262–65. 
 47.    THE NATION’S RESPONSES, supra note 16, at 33–34. 
 48.   Id. 
 49.   Id. at 33.  
 50.   This stated preference for markets is much moderated by other considerations 
such as the importance to society and legislators of the activity at hand.  For example, 
automobile insurance is not left to the market; drivers are required to buy liability 
insurance and insurance for their own injuries in many states, and insurers in every state 
are required to sell liability insurance to high-risk drivers they would rather not insure.  
See Jennifer Wriggins, Mandates, Markets, and Risk: Auto Insurance and the Affordable 
Care Act, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 275, 301–04, 318–21 (2013).  States regulate property 
insurance rates for excessiveness, inadequacy, and unfair discrimination.  Angelo 
Borselli, Insurance Rates: Regulation in Comparison with Open Competition, 18 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 109, 128–32 (2011).   
51.   Scales, supra note 3, at 17–18.     
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coverage does not cover flood and water damage and has excluded these 
types of losses since at least the mid-twentieth century.52  The federal 
government provided flood insurance in part to try to fill this void in the 
market coverage of these losses.53  The NFIP was passed in an era when 
optimism about the government solving problems was at its zenith and 
when a large Democratic majority filled both houses under the leadership 
of President Johnson.54  It was part of a shift in government risk 
management that took place in the 1960s, emphasizing government 
protection of consumers, homeowners, and others from myriad risks.55 
The new law had room for a flexible timetable to implement the 
flood insurance program, and a number of experts recommended 
proceeding with it on a pilot basis.56  Experts recommended caution 
because identifying flood hazard areas, setting insurance rates, and 
giving technical advice to states and communities on floodplain 
management would be very expensive, time-consuming, and 
complicated.57  However, the first administrator of the program, in tune 
with the spirit of the Great Society, moved aggressively to establish a 
national program.58 
 
52.   KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 84–85; MOSS, supra note 16, 
at 262; Scales, supra note 3, at 17; GAO, 2006 FLOOD INSURANCE HIGH-RISK REPORT, 
supra note 7, at 6–7;  Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 21–22.  
53.    The congressional findings and declaration of purpose for the National Flood 
Insurance Act state: 
The Congress also finds that (1) many factors have made it uneconomic for the 
private insurance industry alone to make flood insurance available to those in 
need of such protection on reasonable terms and conditions; but (2) a program 
of flood insurance with large-scale participation of the Federal Government and 
carried out to the maximum extent possible by the private insurance industry is 
feasible and can be initiated. 
42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2012).  Market failure is a widely accepted reason for the government 
to provide insurance, and many believe that there was market failure before the federal 
government began providing federal flood insurance.  Scales, supra note 3, at 17–18.  But 
see Eli Lehrer, Watery Marauders: How the Federal Government Retarded the 
Development of Private Flood Insurance, ISSUE ANALYSIS, Aug. 2007, at 21–22 (arguing 
federal policy such as levee construction and federal government support of flood 
insurance made private market sale of flood insurance even more unattractive than it 
would otherwise have been).  In any event, with barriers to entry like expensive flood 
maps and the highly correlated risk of floods, it was not an enticing market for the private 
sector.  Scales, supra note 3, at 17–18.   
54.   See Scales, supra note 3, at 19.  
55.  MOSS, supra note 16, at 8–9, 264.  
56.   42 U.S.C. § 4001; THE NATION’S RESPONSES, supra note 16, at 33. 
57.   THE NATION’S RESPONSES, supra note 16, at 33.  
58.   Id. at 34.  The term ‘Great Society’ was President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s term 
to refer to his legislative agenda in the 1960s, including aid to education, Medicare, urban 
renewal, antipoverty programs, expansion of social security, and the Voting Rights Act.  
See Lyndon B. Johnson, WHITE HOUSE, 
WRIGGINS FINAL [SEND TO PRINT] (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  3:26 PM 
2014] FLOOD MONEY 375 
3.  The Flood Act’s Broad Goals for the National Flood Insurance  
 Program 
The Flood Act envisioned several goals for the NFIP.  On the one 
hand, as phrased by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), the 
NFIP was intended “to reduce the federal government’s escalating costs 
for repairing flood damage after disasters.”59  On the other hand, its 
primary public policy goal was to provide “flood insurance in flood-
prone areas to property owners who otherwise would not be able to 
obtain it,” under “reasonable terms and conditions.”60  Another goal was 
to improve floodplain management so that flood losses would be less 
severe than they otherwise would be.61  The statute also called for a 
unified floodplain management program.62  The ultimate goal was 
twofold:  (1) that the federal government could develop a workable flood 
insurance product that would pay for homeowners’ flood losses, and (2) 
that this insurance, coupled with incentives for local communities to 
have and enforce land use measures that would reduce the damage from 
floods, would ultimately lower the amount of funding needed for federal 
disaster relief.63 
 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/lyndonbjohnson/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2014).  
See generally JOHN A. ANDREW III, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE GREAT SOCIETY (1999).  
59.   U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-631T, NATIONAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE PROGRAM, CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS FINANCIAL AND 
OPERATIONAL ISSUES 4 (2010) [hereinafter GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED 
REPORT].  
60.   Id. at 5; 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a). 
61.   The congressional findings and declaration state in part: 
 [A]s a matter of national policy, a reasonable method of sharing the risk of 
flood losses is through a program of flood insurance which can complement 
and encourage preventive and protective measures; and if such a program is 
initiated and carried out gradually, it can be expanded as knowledge is gained 
and experience is appraised, thus eventually making flood insurance coverage 
available on reasonable terms and conditions to have persons who have need 
for such protection. 
42 U.S.C. § 4001(a).  Further: 
 [A] program of flood insurance can promote the public interest by providing 
appropriate protection against the perils of flood losses and encouraging sound 
land use by minimizing exposure of property to flood losses; and (2) the 
objectives of a flood insurance program should be integrally related to a unified 
national program for management. 
42 U.S.C. § 4001(c).  Scales, supra note 3, at 12, 14. 
62.   “Unified national program for floodplain management[:]  The Congress further 
finds that . . . (2) the objectives of a flood insurance program should be integrally related 
to a unified national program for flood plain management . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 4001(c). 
63.   Scales, supra note 3, at 12, 14.  Land use planning is, of course, typically a local 
and state concern.  Id. at 12.    
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4.  The Basic Framework 
The broad framework was a carrot approach:  if communities in 
flood-prone areas adopted floodplain management strategies and land use 
codes acceptable to the federal government, the residents of those 
communities would be eligible to purchase government-provided flood 
insurance which they could not purchase otherwise.64  Even the most 
high-risk properties located in flood zones would be sold insurance; no 
risk was too great to be insured.65 
However, there was no stick to go with the carrot to limit 
development in floodplains and ultimately reduce federal disaster relief 
costs.  Few mechanisms existed to ensure that communities enforced 
their land-use regulations.66 
Subsidies are a key aspect of the NFIP and have been part of the 
program from the beginning.  Congress specified that the oldest 
properties, those built before 1974 or before the first flood maps were 
issued, would receive subsidized flood insurance rates.67  These rates 
have been less than half of what actuarial, full-risk rates would be—
between 35 and 45 percent.68  Congress’s rationale for these subsidies 
(also known as pre-Flood Insurance Rate Map subsidies or “pre-FIRM”) 
was that, in order to encourage participation and because these houses 
were not built with flood risk in mind, they should be eligible for deeply 
discounted rates.69  Flood insurance policies were standardized, “off-the-
rack” policies, providing limited coverage:  a maximum of $250,000 for 
 
64.    KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 84–85; Scales, supra note 3, at 
12; INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13, at 2.  If a person lived in a high risk 
area and her community did not adopt a management plan, the federal insurance was not 
available.  However, all or virtually all inhabited flood-prone areas have adopted an 
acceptable management plan.  Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 8.  
65.    Scales, supra note 3, at 13; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-12, 
FLOOD INSURANCE: FEMA’S RATE-SETTING PROCESS WARRANTS ATTENTION 11–18 
(2008) [hereinafter GAO, 2008 FEMA’S RATE-SETTING PROCESS REPORT]. 
66.    Scales, supra note 3, at 13; Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 8–11; 
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 17; Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. 
Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 
SMU L. REV. 1471, 1496–98 (2007).  
67.    FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7; Scales, supra note 3, at 16; GAO, 2013 
SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 9.   
68.    U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-297, ACTION NEEDED TO 
IMPROVE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 52 (2011) 
[hereinafter GAO, 2011 ACTION NEEDED REPORT] (reporting that rates for older properties 
in high-risk zones are 40–45% of what full risk rates would be); INS. INFO. INST., Flood 
Insurance, supra note 13 (reporting that subsidized rates have been 35–45% of what full 
risk rates would be). 
69.    FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7; Scales, supra note 3, at 16; GAO, 2013 
SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 9.  These are also known as “Pre-
FIRM” subsidies.  Id. 
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the house structure and $150,000 for contents.70  Congress expected that 
the subsidies would be temporary, as old, risky houses would be replaced 
by new, more flood-resistant homes.71 
Another significant characteristic of the NFIP is its allocation of 
risk.  In an arrangement that the Insurance Information Institute describes 
as “unique” in the developed world, the NFIP and the Treasury 
Department bore all of the risk of the flood policies written under the 
NFIP.72  Private companies selling government policies would take no 
risk. 
Finally, the government needed to determine which parts of the 
country were at high risk of flooding.  Consequently, the Flood Act 
called for the creation of detailed maps revealing flood risk which would 
then be used to set rates.73 
B.  Evolution of the National Flood Insurance Program from 1968-
2012 
How did the NFIP evolve from its start in 1968 to the 2012 
reforms?  Throughout its existence, the NFIP has been housed in various 
agencies, including first the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”), then the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (“FEMA”), and finally the Department of Homeland Security 
(although still within FEMA).74  This section highlights the expansion of 
the NFIP and subsidies, the bailouts that resulted from its financial 
structure, the mandates that resulted from lack of demand for the 
product, and the mapping of flood-prone areas. 
1.  Community Participation 
The framework of the NFIP made flood insurance available to those 
communities that adopted land use codes and floodplain management 
strategies that were acceptable to the federal government.  By 2010, 
 
70.    See Standard Flood Insurance Policy Forms, FEMA.GOV, 
http://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program/standard-flood-insurance-policy-
forms (last visited Feb. 16, 2014); INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13.  They 
do not cover damage to finished basements.  Id.  The First Circuit Court of Appeals has 
decided that a bank can require flood insurance for the full value of the house, not just the 
remaining amount due on the mortgage.  Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 738 
F.3d 432, 446 (1st Cir. 2013).  
71.  GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 2. 
72.    INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13; see Scales, supra note 3, at 14.  
73.    KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 84–85; GAO, 2010 
CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 7; GAO, 2008 FEMA’S RATE-
SETTING PROCESS REPORT, supra note 65, at 11–18.   
74.    Scales, supra note 3, at 13–14.  
WRIGGINS FINAL [SEND TO PRINT] (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  3:26 PM 
378 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:2 
participating communities covered virtually all inhabited areas subject to 
floods.75  Roughly 22,000 communities had taken the steps necessary to 
participate.76 
2.  Expanded Subsidies 
Congress, as noted above,77 required subsidized rates for old 
houses—those built before 1974 or before a flood insurance rate map 
was published.78  FEMA, in administering the NFIP, later instituted a 
second type of subsidy known as “grandfathering.”  These 
grandfathering subsidies applied in two circumstances.79  First, when 
flood risk maps changed so that a house which had been in a low risk 
zone was remapped into a high risk zone, the initial lower rate still 
applied to the house.80  Second, when a policyholder in a high risk zone 
built a house in compliance with flood maps, she could keep rates that 
reflected that compliance, even if a later map showed yet more risk and 
would have resulted in a higher premium without the subsidy.81  FEMA 
introduced these additional subsidies, according to the GAO, “because of 
external pressures to reduce the effects of rate increases, considerations 
of equity, ease of administration, and promoting management.”82  
Overall, the highest risk properties received the biggest subsidies.83 
Congress and FEMA adopted the two types of subsidies to 
encourage participation, increase administrative ease, and promote an 
undefined concept of fairness.  “[E]xternal pressures,” perhaps more 
accurately defined as “political pressures,” to keep rates down, also 
played a role in Congress’s adoption of the subsidies. 
 
75.    Apparently the few flood-prone areas that did not participate either had few 
structures or only small areas of serious flood risk.  If a person lived outside a high-risk 
area she could still purchase flood insurance.  Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 8. 
76.    GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 4.  As of 
July 2013, the 22,000 figure was still used.  GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, 
supra note 3, at 5.    
77.    See supra Part I.A.4.  
78.    See supra Part I.A.4. 
79.    See supra Part I.A.4. 
80.    GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 7, 14.  This 
is the type of subsidy most commonly referred to as “grandfathering” in this context.  The 
“old house” subsidies are sometimes referred to as grandfathered also.   
81.    Implementation of the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012: One 
Year After Enactment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Policy of the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013), 2013 WLNR 23334770 
[hereinafter FEMA Administrator 2013 Written Testimony] (written testimony of Craig 
Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency) (explaining types of 
subsidies). 
82.    GAO, 2011 PUBLIC POLICY GOALS REPORT, supra note 26, at 4; Scales, supra 
note 3, at 15. 
83.    GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 7, 14. 
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The same number of properties—roughly one million—remained 
subsidized from the start of the program until 2012.  These subsidized 
policies made up a smaller proportion of the total number of flood 
policies as the total number of flood insurance policies increased.84  
There are currently about 5.5 million flood policies in the United States; 
about one-fifth of these policies had subsidized rates immediately prior 
to the flood insurance reforms of 2012.85  Many of these subsidized 
policies insured properties that suffer repetitive flood losses.  In 2010, 
the GAO estimated that the repetitive loss policies comprise only one 
percent of policies, but they “account for 25% to 30% of claims.”86  The 
supposedly non-subsidized, or full-risk policies (the remaining four-fifths 
of the policies) also do not reflect the actual risk of flooding; it is fair to 
say that all the NFIP policies were subsidized prior to the passage of the 
2012 reforms.87  About 70 percent of flood policies are located in five 
states:  Florida, Texas, California, Louisiana, and New Jersey; Florida’s 
policies alone comprise about 40 percent of the total.88 
3.  Repeated Bailouts 
 The flood insurance subsidies meant that the NFIP would not 
always be able to support itself.  In fact, it was designed to run a deficit 
in years with large flood losses.89  As the GAO has stated, the NFIP was 
“not designed to be actuarially sound.”90  The NFIP’s financial structure 
has not allowed it to build up a reserve fund, and it has had to borrow 
 
84.    Originally 70% of the policies had been subsidized.  Scales, supra note 3, at 16.  
85.    FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7; GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 6.  The actual number is closer to 1,153,000.  Id. at 31–32.  As of 
December 31, 2013, the precise number was 5,497,151.  Policy Statistics, BUREAUNET, 
http://bsa.nfipstat.fema.gov/reports/1011.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).  Florida had 
2,037,707 policies as of that date.  Id.  
86.    GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 7, 14. 
87.  Id. at 5–7.  In this article, the term “subsidies” generally refers to the explicit 
general subsidies for older home and grandfathered properties.  See Parts I.A.4, I.B.2. 
88.    KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 112–13; Policy Statistics, 
supra note 85. 
89.    KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 111–12.  As of May, 2013, 
FEMA owed the Treasury Department $24 billion.  GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.  This was never expected to be fully paid back.  Id. 
90.    GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 5-6.  For a 
program to be “actuarially sound,” the total premiums collected should more than offset 
the total claims paid out.  Sunset provisions have always been part of the law, and 
Congress has even let the program lapse at times.  See generally, e.g., Christina Equi, 
Oops, They Did It Again. Because of Congress, There is No Flood Insurance Available! 
What is a Lender to Do?, METAVANTE REGULATORY SERVICES: HOT ISSUE (Metavante 
Corp., Milwaukee, Wis.), Apr. 1, 2010, 2010 WL 1641007. 
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from the Treasury Department when premiums do not cover losses.91  
The NFIP has had staggering deficits at times, especially in recent 
years.92 
4.   Purchase Mandates in High-Risk Zones 
Purchase of flood insurance was initially voluntary; legislators 
assumed that homeowners in areas at high risk of flood would want to 
buy the insurance, particularly in light of the generous subsidies.  
However, demand was unexpectedly low.  Congress then added the 
requirement that, whenever any federally regulated bank has a mortgage 
in a high-risk flood zone, flood insurance must be on the property 
throughout the life of the loan.93  Borrowers must buy the insurance, and 
lenders must make sure that they do.94  By contrast, when a house in a 
high-risk zone has no mortgage, there is no flood insurance purchase 
requirement.95  No purchase mandate exists for properties outside high-
risk zones.96 
5.  Mapping and Rate-Setting 
The NFIP developed flood maps for the entire nation, as set out in 
the Flood Act.  However, this was a difficult and expensive project for 
which Congress did not provide sufficient money.97  The NFIP set flood 
insurance rates as was required.98 
6.  Sale by Private Companies:  The “Write-Your-Own” Program 
Because of weak demand even for discounted flood policies,99 
Congress made reforms to encourage private companies to sell the 
 
 91.  KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 112–13; Scales, supra note 3, 
at 16–17. 
 92.  GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 1–2.   
 93.  KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 86.  This requirement was put 
into place in 1973 and expanded in 1994.  GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED 
REPORT, supra note 59, at 4; INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13.  
 94.  INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13.  This requirement, often 
known as the “lenders’ mandate,” effectively applies to all properties that are mortgaged.  
Scales, supra note 3, at 18.   
 95.  Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 13–16.   
 96.  Id. at 13–16.   
 97.  Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and 
Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 159–63 (1985–1986). 
 98.  See generally GAO, 2008 FEMA’S RATE-SETTING PROCESS REPORT, supra note 
65.   
  99.  See LLOYD DIXON ET AL., RAND CORP., THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
PROGRAM’S MARKET PENETRATION RATE, at xix, 1 (2006), available at 
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insurance based on the idea that private companies are better than the 
government at selling insurance.  The flood insurance provided through 
the NFIP has gone through different iterations, but in 1983, the NFIP 
became a public-private partnership in which the NFIP acted as the 
actual underwriter while private insurers, such as homeowners insurance 
companies, generally sold the policies, receiving sales commissions and 
compensation for loss-adjustment expenses.100 
7.  Floodplain Management and Flood Mitigation 
One of the NFIP’s goals was to improve floodplain management 
and mitigation so that losses from floods would be reduced.101  The 
Flood Act gave the Secretary of the HUD the authority to set minimum 
criteria for zoning in floodplains.102  The NFIP’s broad framework, as 
outlined earlier, required communities that wanted residents to be able to 
buy flood insurance to pass ordinances satisfying criteria set by the 
program.  When communities passed such ordinances, they became 
eligible for grants to reduce flood losses, and then residents of those 
communities could purchase flood insurance. 
FEMA has worked to help homeowners and communities mitigate 
properties by supporting improvements aimed to reduce flood damage, 
such as demolition, relocation, and elevation.  30,000 properties were 
mitigated using FEMA funds between 1997 and 2007.103  Building codes 
aimed at reducing flood risk play an important role in flood mitigation; 
for example, certain codes require new construction in a high risk area to 
conform to elevation requirements which will likely reduce flood 
 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR300.pdf; 
see infra Part II.B.2 (describing limited demand for flood insurance and reasons).  
 100. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 85; Scales, supra note 3, at 14.  
This is known as the “Write-Your-Own” (“WYO”) program, although it seems to be a 
misnomer because the policies are written by the NFIP.  Scales, supra note 3, at 14.  The 
companies collect premiums, enroll policyholders, and administer claims.  Id.; see 42 
U.S.C. § 4071(a)(1) (2012).  Private companies, selling federal policies, are referred to as 
“fiscal agents” of the federal government.  See 42 U.S.C. § 4071(a)(1) (2012).   
 101.  “Mitigation” is defined in this context as risk reduction measures such as storm 
shutters and the use of flood-resistant building material.  KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-
KERJAN, supra note 3, at 249–50.  Mitigation measures can significantly reduce the costs 
of repairs.  Id. at 250–51.  The 1968 federal legislation stated:   
It is the further purpose of this chapter to (1) encourage state and local 
governments to make appropriate land use adjustments to constrain the 
development of land which is exposed to flood damage and minimize damage 
caused by flood losses,  (2) guide the development of proposed future 
construction, where practicable, away from locations which are threatened by 
flood hazards . . . .  
42 U.S.C. § 4001(e) (2012).  
 102.  Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 8–11; Houck, supra note 97, at 69.  
 103.  GAO, 2011 PUBLIC POLICY GOALS REPORT, supra note 26, at 6.   
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damage.104  Existing buildings in flood zones, on the other hand, are 
treated very differently.  They do not need to be updated to be in 
compliance with current building codes unless they are being repaired or 
reconstructed and the work is worth more than 50 percent of the market 
value.105  In addition to supporting mitigation, a large part of federal 
floodplain management has consisted of levee construction and 
maintenance.106 
8.   Relationship to Federal Disaster Relief 
One of the goals of the NFIP was to reduce disaster relief costs.107  
Federal disaster relief is activated by a federal declaration of an area as a 
disaster area under the Stafford Act.108  Immediate rescue efforts are part 
of disaster relief, but disaster relief also includes housing assistance.109 
The line between disaster housing assistance provided by FEMA 
and benefits supplied by individually purchased flood insurance coverage 
is not always clear.  FEMA states that its disaster housing assistance “is 
not intended to restore your damaged property to its condition before the 
disaster.”110  FEMA lists the following under “housing needs/temporary 
housing”:  “financial assistance may be available to the homeowner to 
repair damage from the disaster to their primary residence that is not 
covered by insurance.  The goal is to make the damaged home safe, 
sanitary, and functional.”111  Flood insurance must be used before relief 
 
 104. INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13.  
 105. Id.; see 44 C.F.R. §§ 51.1, 60.3(c)(2).  This regulation creates incentives to not 
engage in expensive renovations but to keep renovations limited so as not to be required 
to rebuild to code.  It encourages not renovating or breaking up large renovation projects 
into small projects so as not to pass the 50% threshold.  FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., AM. 
INSTS. FOR RESEARCH, AN EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: 
FINAL REPORT 42 (2006), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/20130726-1602-20490-1463/nfip_eval_final_report.pdf.  
 106.  See NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., Levee Report, supra note 30; THE NATION’S RESPONSES, 
supra note 16; Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3.  Levees are structures built to hold 
back water so that people can live nearby.  Levees both reduce and increase risk—they 
reduce it by holding back the water, but they also increase it by creating the impression 
that they are totally safe.  Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3; see NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., 
Levee Report, supra note 30; THE NATION’S RESPONSES, supra note 16. 
 107.  42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2012).  
 108.  Lake, supra note 24, at 95.  
 109.  Disaster Assistance Available from FEMA, FEMA.GOV, 
http://www.fema.gov/disaster-assistance-available-fema, (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).   
 110.  What is Disaster Assistance?, FEMA.GOV, http://www.fema.gov/what-disaster-
assistance (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).   
 111.  There is similar language that “[f]inancial assistance may be available to 
homeowners to replace their home destroyed in the disaster that is not covered by 
insurance.”  Disaster Assistance Available from FEMA, supra note 109.  FEMA notes 
that the grants are funded by taxpayers and have a limit.  What Specific Items are 
Covered by “Housing Assistance”?, FEMA.GOV, http://www.fema.gov/apply-
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may be received, according to the FEMA website.112  FEMA also 
provides rebuilding and other loans for people in flood-damaged areas.113  
Further, FEMA supplies temporary housing assistance, which flood 
insurance does not.114  Although FEMA tries to sharply distinguish 
between flood insurance and disaster relief, there is some overlap.115 
9.  The NFIP in 2012 
By 2012 the NFIP had developed into a multifaceted program that 
had mapped the country for flood risk and had the participation of almost 
all flood-prone communities across the country.  There were about 5.5 
million flood policies and about one-fifth were heavily subsidized.  Deep 
subsidies and huge storms had led to significant deficits.  Because of low 
demand, mortgage holders in flood-prone areas were required to keep 
flood insurance in place.  Private companies sold policies to increase 
demand, though the U.S. government shouldered all the risk.  Floodplain 
management included grants for mitigating properties so they were more 
resistant to floods, zoning laws requiring elevation of new structures but 
not older structures, and levee construction and maintenance.  Federal 
disaster relief included both rescue efforts and housing assistance, some 
of which overlapped with flood insurance benefits.  Although the NFIP 
was ambitious, its impossible goals would eventually lead to reform. 
 
assistance/what-specific-items-are-covered-housing-assistance (last visited Oct. 15, 
2014).  Repair assistance may cover structural parts of the home such as foundation, 
outside walls, roof, windows, floors, walls, ceilings, septic, or sewage system.  Id.  It may 
also cover well or water system, heating, ventilating, and air conditioning system, 
utilities, anchoring and blocking a mobile home, and other elements.  Id.    
 112.  The website specifies that these grants cannot be given if someone has insurance 
to cover them.  See supra note 110 and accompanying text.  These grants seem to cover 
much of what would otherwise be covered by insurance.  FEMA’s literature urges people 
at risk to buy insurance because it puts you “in control” while disaster relief is uncertain.  
See infra notes 184–87 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 220. 
 113.  Disaster Assistance Available from FEMA, supra note 109. 
 114.   DIXON ET AL., supra note 99, at 53–54.   
 115. See infra notes 183–86 and accompanying text.  Reflecting this problem of the 
relationship between flood insurance and disaster relief, some homeowners whose houses 
were damaged by Superstorm Sandy wished that they did not have flood insurance and 
could instead have relied solely on disaster relief.  Alan Krawitz, After Flood Insurance 
Problems Persist, Some in South Queens, Rockaway Say They Feel They Would Have 
Fared Better Without It, FORUM NEWSGROUP (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://theforumnewsgroup.com/2014/01/09/after-flood-insurance-problems-persist-some-
in-south-queens-rockaway-say-they-feel-they-would-have-fared-better-without-it/. 
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II.   FEDERAL FLOOD INSURANCE POLICY:  ASSESSMENT OF THE 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM PRIOR TO THE 2012 AND 
2014 REFORMS 
This section discusses the NFIP’s progress towards its goals, 
reviews its impacts, and summarizes criticisms of it.  Before focusing on 
the negatives and criticisms, it is important to note the NFIP’s 
successes.116  It has made flood insurance widely available, both within 
and outside flood zones.117  Approximately $1 billion annually in flood 
losses are avoided because of mitigation and floodplain management 
measures.118  The NFIP has mitigated thousands of buildings so they will 
be more resistant to flood damage going forward.119  Most new buildings 
in flood zones are built according to NFIP standards and are more 
resistant to flood damage than they would be otherwise.120  But 
Congress, in establishing and continuing the NFIP, set itself impossible 
challenges and created incentives which are increasingly problematic 
given climate change risk. 
A.   The National Flood Insurance Program’s Conflicting and 
Unattainable Goals 
The goals of the NFIP were in conflict and exceedingly unlikely to 
be met even in the best of circumstances and even in the absence of 
climate change.  The NFIP, as noted above, had three main goals:  first, 
providing insurance to people in flood-prone areas who could not 
otherwise get it on “reasonable terms and conditions;”121 second, 
reducing disaster relief costs;122 and third, improving floodplain 
management so that disaster relief costs are reduced.123  The aim of 
providing flood insurance on reasonable terms and conditions conflicts 
with the aim of saving federal money expressed in the second and third 
goals.  This conflict becomes apparent when one analyzes the goal of 
supplying insurance on “reasonable terms and conditions” for people in 
 
 116.  See infra note 117. 
 117.  GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 8.  In high-
risk zones it is estimated that roughly 50% of homes have flood insurance.  DIXON ET AL., 
supra note 99, at xvi. 
 118.  FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., supra note 105, at 8–9; CAMILO SARMIENTO & TED R. 
MILLER, AM. INSTS. FOR RESEARCH, COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF FLOODING AND THE 
IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM at ix (2006).  
 119.  GAO, 2011 PUBLIC POLICY GOALS REPORT, supra note 26, at 6.   
 120.  FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., supra note 105, at xi. 
 121.  42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2012).  
 122.  Id.  
 123.  Id.  
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flood-prone areas who could not otherwise obtain insurance.124  If 
“reasonable terms” means “affordable” and the insurance is affordable 
because it does not reflect the actual flood risk, as is the case with the 
NFIP, then the premiums will not cover the losses sustained.  
Consequently, the NFIP will lose money.  Having a government 
insurance program with premiums that are lower than they would be if 
they reflected actual flood risk is a solidaristic approach to flood risk.125  
Flood risk is a very difficult risk to insure, as the next section explains.126  
“Affordable flood insurance” is almost a contradiction in terms for older 
houses in high-risk areas if we think of “insurance” rates as being based 
on individual risk.  The government losing money on the insurance 
aspect of the program, then, is a predictable part of providing affordable 
insurance for people in flood-prone areas. 
Moreover, the general aim of saving federal money, as expressed in 
the second and third goals of reducing disaster relief costs and improving 
floodplain management, was very unlikely to succeed.  Congress 
presumed that the federal government would not have to pay as much for 
disaster assistance if there were enforced rules in flood-prone areas 
requiring safer construction and if people bought insurance for flood 
damage.127  This plan made theoretical sense, but there have been at least 
three major problems in practice.  First, if below-market insurance is 
available and federal management such as levee construction encourages 
people to move to and feel safe in flood-prone areas, more property, not 
less, will be at risk of flood damage.  Furthermore, supplying cheap 
insurance for older buildings may discourage replacing or renovating 
them to improve their flood resistance.128  Higher disaster-relief costs 
may result.129  Second, the program had no practical way to compel safer 
construction in flood-prone areas, again resulting in more at-risk 
property.130  And third, one of the enduring problems with flood 
insurance is lack of demand resulting in many losses remaining 
uninsured.131  Ironically, the goal of saving federal money through 
improved floodplain management practices leading to less at-risk 
property was undermined by the very fact of offering below-market 
insurance in high-risk areas, as well as by the lack of enforcement of 
land-use regulations that might reduce flood damage.  Before 2012, the 
 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  See O’NEILL & O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 6–7. 
 126.  See infra Part II.B. 
 127.  See generally supra Part I.A.4; FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., supra note 105; 
SARMIENTO & MILLER, supra note 118.  
 128.  SARMIENTO & MILLER, supra note 118, at x.  
 129.  KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 262–63.   
 130.  See supra Part I.A.4, I.B.7.  
 131.  See supra Part I.B.4; infra Parts II.B.2, III.A.1.d.  
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program did not support the goals related to saving the federal 
government money, though it did make flood insurance widely available 
at low prices.  The general goal of a unified floodplain management 
policy also remained distant.132 
B.  The Difficulty of Insuring Flood Risk at an Inexpensive Price 
The aim of insuring flood losses faces inherent challenges.  In a 
way, this is obvious because if flood risk was easy to insure, there would 
be insurance available for it.  But to understand the NFIP’s challenges, it 
is important to understand the issues from an insurance perspective.  A 
number of factors on both the supply side and the demand side help 
explain why floods are difficult to insure privately.  This explains in part 
how the United States set itself an impossible task by aiming to provide 
flood insurance to homeowners on “reasonable terms and conditions.”  
Few bother to consider why private insurers have declined to offer basic 
homeowners coverage for floods for the past 50 years.  For example, one 
op-ed writer criticizing the 2012 reforms states that the NFIP had 
“cornered the market” for flood insurance, as if it were a desirable risk 
that the federal government had stolen from the private market rather 
than a difficult and unprepossessing risk the federal government began to 
cover in the absence of private market coverage.133 
1.  Supply Side 
a.  Correlated and Ambiguous Risk 
Floods and other natural disasters cause correlated losses.134  The 
losses from these events are likely to be massive, close in time, and 
centered upon one geographical area.  Insurance works by diversifying 
risk; correlated risk is the opposite.135  The presence of correlated risks 
makes insurance companies reluctant or unwilling to sell insurance.136 
 
 132.  42 U.S.C. § 4001(c) (2012). 
 133.  John Romano, From Top to Bottom, FEMA Has Botched Handling Flood 
Insurance Rates, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 7, 2014, 10:06 PM), 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/from-top-to-bottom-fema-has-botched-handling-
flood-insurance-rates/2164725. 
 134.  See supra text accompanying note 29; Scales, supra note 3, at 10–11; Luke & 
Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 23–24. 
 135.  See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 5.    
 136.  Indeed, natural disasters, even with the various exclusions in private insurance 
policies, have seriously strained private insurers.  See, e.g., Hornstein, supra note 3, at 
14–15; FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY 47–49 (2013).  
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In addition, the probability and extent of natural disasters is difficult 
to predict, particularly with climate change.137  When risks are 
ambiguous, pricing insurance is troublesome, and insurance tends to be 
extremely expensive to account for the ambiguity of the risk.  Thus, it 
may be priced too high for customers to be willing to buy it.138 
b.  Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection is the tendency of higher-risk individuals to be 
more inclined to purchase insurance than lower-risk individuals.139  In 
theory, adverse selection leads to a pool containing more higher-risk 
members than insurance companies anticipate, which leads to more 
claims than predicted, higher prices, and eventual market failure.140  
Some have questioned the actual influence of adverse selection in 
insurance markets.141  Classically, the concept has been applied to health 
and life insurance in which the insured may have access to better 
information about his or her risks than the insurance company, and it is 
typically referred to as an “information problem” for that reason.142  
Adverse selection is viewed by the insurance industry as having been an 
important deterrent to providing private flood insurance.143 
In the case of flood insurance, where rates are based on maps setting 
out flood zones that are available to both the insured and the insurer, that 
classic information-imbalance issue is less persuasive than in other 
contexts.144  But individuals still have much more information about their 
individual properties than companies writing insurance for the NFIP, so 
adverse selection may nonetheless still have effects on the willingness of 
insurance companies to provide flood insurance.145 
 
 137.  See sources cited supra notes 15, 21; KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra 
note 3, at 132–133.  
 138.  KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 134–135. 
 139.  See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 5, at 6 –7.  
 140.  Scales, supra note 3, at 8–9.  
 141.  See generally, e.g., Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: 
An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004). 
 142.  Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 25.  
 143.  Scales, supra note 3, at 9. 
 144.  Id.  
 145.  While flood insurance is required for lending in flood hazard zones, this 
requirement has been lightly enforced particularly after the closing.  Luke & 
Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 14–16.  Individuals often let their flood policies lapse after 
closing.  Id.  Banks often sell the first mortgage on a property to another bank which does 
not enforce the requirement.   INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13; see supra 
Part I.B.; see infra Part III.A.1.d.  For those individuals that keep their policies in force, it 
is possible that their decisions reflect having information about their properties’ particular 
vulnerabilities that makes them riskier to insure than the rest of the risk pool.  That would 
be adverse selection currently at work.   
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Private insurance uses several methods to try to counter adverse 
selection.  Part of underwriting, in the absence of regulation, is that 
private insurance companies may choose not to insure people who they 
think are high risk, they may charge high-risk people more, or they may 
choose not to renew policies which they believe carry too much risk.146  
The NFIP has not been allowed to decline flood insurance to properties 
that are high risk, and there have been strict statutory limits on rate 
increases.147  Thus, the NFIP is vulnerable to adverse selection.148 
c.  Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard is the idea that, if an individual is insured for a loss, 
she will take fewer precautions to avoid it, and, collectively, losses will 
be greater than if there was no insurance for the losses.149  It also applies 
beyond the insurance context to the theory that any sort of cost-shifting, 
including post-disaster assistance, decreases individuals’ loss-avoiding 
behavior.150  Insurance companies try to control moral hazard through 
mechanisms such as co-pays and deductibles so that individuals will 
exercise the same level of care that they would without insurance.151 
The way moral hazard comes into play in the context of flood 
insurance is that insurance available at a subsidized, affordable price for 
homes in a high-risk area may increase the willingness of people to live 
in flood-prone areas and if they do, to not take adequate precautions for 
their property.152  As noted earlier, roughly one percent of the properties 
insured by the NFIP have accounted for almost a third of the losses.153  
Disaster relief may have moral hazard effects when people in flood-
prone areas, knowing that the federal government provides disaster 
relief, decide not to buy flood insurance or let policies lapse when they 
do.154  The idea that flood insurance and disaster assistance increases 
 
 146. ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 45–50.     
 147. GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 5–6.   
 148. Also, as noted above, it charges the highest risk properties (the oldest properties 
built without flood risk in mind) the lowest rates.  See supra Part I.A.4.  
 149. BAKER, supra note 5, at 4–5.  
 150. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 27.  The extent, meaning, and significance 
of moral hazard has been brilliantly questioned in Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of 
Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).  
 151. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 27–28; BAKER, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
 152. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 28.  
 153. GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 10. 
 154. See Trebilcock & Daniels, supra note 33, at 104 (asserting that “ex post disaster 
relief . . . has all kinds of perverse incentive effects, severely exacerbating problems of 
adverse selection . . . in locational decisions by enabling residents of disaster-prone areas 
to externalize a large fraction of the cost of their locational decisions onto other[s] . . . ”); 
ERWIN O. MICHEL-KERJAN, HAVE WE ENTERED AN EVER-GROWING CYCLE ON 
GOVERNMENT DISASTER RELIEF? (2013), available at 
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people’s willingness to live in flood-prone areas is accepted by many 
scholars155 but not all.156  Floodplain-management zoning regulations are 
aimed at controlling moral hazard because they try to decrease the costs 
of flood loss and compel people to exercise more care when rebuilding, 
for example, by requiring that new structures be elevated.157  However, 
these codes are often under-enforced in high-hazard areas.158  
 Government actions such as levee construction and defining areas 
as floodplains may encourage people to think that they live in safe areas 
and therefore to not buy flood insurance or  invest in protective 
measures, even if they can afford them.159  Many floods happen outside 
high-risk flood zones, and the designation of such zones may suggest to 
people who live outside the zones that their homes will be safe from 
floods, even if they are close to water.160 
d. Information and Mapping 
Information about precise flood risk is difficult and expensive to 
develop.  FEMA has prepared flood maps for the United States, but 
many are outdated.161  Mapping technology has rapidly advanced, 
however, so that it may no longer be quite so difficult to develop 
adequate maps.162  Because risk analysis has become much more 
sophisticated, FEMA should be able to develop very finely tuned risk 
 
http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/US-Senate-Small-Business-
Cte_2013Mar14_MichelKerjan.pdf.  
 155.  See, e.g., Raymond Burby, Flood Insurance and Floodplain Management: The 
U.S. Experience, 3 ENVTL. HAZARDS 111 (2001); Blake Hudson, Reconstituting Land-Use 
Federalism to Address Transitory and Perpetual Disasters: The Bimodal Federalism 
Framework, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1991, 2003–04 (2011); Marc Poirier, A Very Clear Blue 
Line: Behavioral Economics, Public Choice, Public Art, and Sea Level Rise, 16 S.E. 
ENVTL. L.J. 83, 92 (2007); Dan Tarlock, U.S. Flood Control Policy, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 151 n.198 (2012); Trebilcock & Daniels, supra note 33, at 104.   
 156.  See, e.g., KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 122 (finding that 
most homeowners in hurricane-prone areas do not expect to get federal assistance 
following a disaster).  
 157.  Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 30.   
 158.  KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 17. 
 159.  See DIXON ET AL., supra note 99, at xvi (noting that the market penetration rate 
of the NFIP outside of specified flood hazard zones is 1%); NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., Levee 
Report, supra note 30 (observing that areas behind levees are not risk free).  Detailed 
discussion of issues involving levee construction and maintenance are beyond the scope 
of this article.  
 160. FEMA notes that people who live outside of flood zones file nearly 25% of NFIP 
claims and receive one third of disaster assistance for flooding.  Resources: Flood Facts, 
FLOODSMART.GOV,   https://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/flood_facts.jsp (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2014).  
 161.  Hornstein, supra note 3, at 33–34; GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS REPORT, 
supra note 59, at 8–9.   
 162.  See Owen, supra note 30.  
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analyses, given sufficient resources.163  Accurate maps would allow 
private companies to make informed decisions about risk and only offer 
insurance if the risk analysis makes sense.164  But given the current 
outdated and inaccurate maps, private companies are unlikely to rush to 
take on flood risk.165 
All these factors—correlated and ambiguous risk, adverse selection, 
moral hazard, and information—affect the supply of flood insurance, 
help explain why it is such a difficult risk to insure, and contribute to 
understanding the challenge the United States has set for itself. 
2.  Demand Side:  Cognitive Biases and Disaster Relief 
Flood insurance is not a product that people eagerly buy.  As 
discussed above, flood insurance is heavily subsidized—by more than 50 
percent for the riskiest properties—and it is therefore an excellent 
bargain.166  Yet, homeowners, even in flood-prone areas, tend not to 
purchase it voluntarily and tend to let their policies lapse after a few 
years.167  Homeowners outside flood zones are even less likely to buy 
it.168  State insurance commissioners’ and FEMA’s repeated messages to 
homeowners urging them to buy flood insurance go unheeded.169  
Enforcement of the lenders’ mandate has been limited at best.170 
The tepid demand has been behind many of the changes in the 
NFIP.171  To its credit, the NFIP in recent years has increased the number 
 
 163.  NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., Levee Report, supra note 30.  This finely grained analysis 
may allow ever more specific flood zones, thus reducing the degree of risk-sharing across 
policyholders, an important point that deserves future consideration.  O’NEILL & 
O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 8.   
 164.  GAO, 2014 PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT REPORT, supra note 4, at 10–11 
(2014).  
 165.  Id. 
 166.  See supra Parts I.A.4, II.B.2; Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 32–42.   
 167.  INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 29, at 41, 48; DIXON ET 
AL., supra note 99, at 25 (stating that within flood zones, approximately 20% of 
properties that are not covered by the mandatory purchase requirement—i.e., properties 
without mortgages—have flood insurance).  
 168.  DIXON ET AL., supra note 99, at xvi (noting that market penetration of flood 
insurance outside flood zones is 1%).   
 169.  See, e.g., Press Release, Md. Ins. Admin., Prepare for Hurricane Season Now 
(May 22, 2013), available at www.mdinsurance.state.md.us/sa/news-center/prepare-for-
hurricane-season-now.html; Brochure, FEMA, Why You Need Flood Insurance (Feb. 1, 
2014), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/4304.  
 170.  INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13 (noting that enforcement of this 
requirement is weak because the first mortgage on property is often sold to another bank).  
Given that banks usually sell mortgages and that homeowners do generally maintain 
property insurance on their homes, it is not clear why the fact that mortgages are sold 
would have particular impact in this context.  However, institutions are as subject to the 
biases discussed here as individuals.  Scales, supra note 3, at 18.  
 171.  According to a 2006 Rand Corporation Study: 
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of policies substantially.172  However, the still low demand contributes to 
the risk of insolvency for the program because there are too few 
policyholders to contribute premiums so the policies can pay for 
losses.173 
Various factors contribute to low demand for flood insurance.  One 
such factor is various cognitive biases behavioral economists have 
studied in recent years.  For example, it is widely known that 
“individuals routinely underestimate the magnitude of low-probability, 
high-loss events”174 and so under-prepare for them.  Many people 
consider flooding a remote risk that is not worth insuring.  At the same 
time, many overpay for events that seem more familiar and salient, such 
as warranties for appliances.175  The failure to plan for risks that seem 
remote is not limited to individuals but applies to governments as well.176 
Often, people have an optimism bias, so that even if they understand 
the flood risk, they convince themselves that the negative event will not 
occur.177  When people have a flood policy for a few years and have not 
made a claim under it, they often let it lapse, sometimes viewing the 
policy as a “poor investment”178 and assuming that because nothing bad 
has happened, nothing bad will happen.  Procrastination is also a 
potential contributor.  No one wants to think about a potential disaster, 
and it is often easier to postpone costs for such a low-probability, 
catastrophic event than to incur them.179 
 
The reluctance of homeowners to purchase flood insurance has been an 
ongoing problem for the NFIP and was the primary reason for adoption of the 
mandatory purchase requirement.  The low rate among homes that are not 
subject to the mandatory purchase requirement suggests that little has changed 
over the years and points to the importance of the mandatory purchase 
requirement in maintaining the market penetration rates that are observed 
today. 
DIXON ET AL., supra note 99, at xxi.  
 172.  GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 8. 
 173.  As the GAO noted in adding the NFIP to its high-risk program, “[t]he extent of 
participation in the program may also contribute to its financial insolvency.  Specifically, 
the level of noncompliance with current mandatory purchase requirement by affected 
property owners is unknown and voluntary participation in the program is limited.”  
GAO, 2006 FLOOD INSURANCE HIGH-RISK REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.  
 174.  Scales, supra note 3, at 9; see INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra 
note 29, at 71–72, 113–115; KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 16.  
 175. INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 29, at 130–132. 
 176.  Scales, supra note 3, at 12.  See generally KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, 
supra note 3 (suggesting ways for governments to be more proactive).  
 177.  Robert J. Meyer, Why We Under-Prepare for Hazards, in ON RISK AND 
DISASTER, supra note 3, at 160. 
 178. INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 29, at 103.    
179.    Robert Meyer writes that “[d]ecisions to invest in protection against low-
probability events are particularly susceptible to procrastination.”  Meyer, supra note 
177, at 164.  The decision to pay for insurance gets pushed into the future until at some 
point it really is too late.  Flood insurance has a 30-day waiting period before it becomes 
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Another bias affecting the choice to purchase flood insurance is the 
availability bias, or the tendency to plan for the future based on the 
recent past or to make a decision based on the most easily accessible 
information.  While shortly after disasters like Hurricane Katrina, the risk 
of floods seems salient and people buy flood insurance, in a few years, 
memories fade and demand goes down.180  Also, people often 
misunderstand terms like “100-year flood” which refers to a one percent 
annual probability of a flood occurring in a particular area at a particular 
height.181  But when an area has flooded, people tend to think they are 
safe for the next 100 years.182 
An additional possible reason people do not buy flood insurance is 
that they think the federal government’s disaster relief will cover their 
losses.183  In recent years, the expectation of disaster aid has affected 
individuals’ decisions to purchase insurance.184  FEMA’s website shows 
overlap between private insurance and disaster relief and specifies that 
private insurance must be used first, which might influence some people 
to not buy flood insurance.185  FEMA has tried to encourage people to 
buy flood insurance by preparing videos that feature people who 
benefited from flood insurance in recent hurricanes and writing 
information sheets contrasting insurance with disaster aid.186  Insurance 
is immediate and puts you more in control after a disaster, FEMA says.187  
It is not clear how persuasive these efforts have been. 
 
effective so that it will not be effective if purchased right before a storm.  Resources: 
Frequently Asked Questions, FLOODSMART.GOV, 
https://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/faqs/will-there-be-a-waiting-period-for-
my-policy-to-take-effect.jsp (last visited Oct., 15, 2014). 
 180.  Scales, supra note 3, at 10; Meyer, supra note 177, at 159.  
 181.  Scales, supra note 3, at 9; NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., Levee Report, supra note 30; 
Howard Kunreuther, Has the Time Come for Comprehensive Natural Disaster 
Insurance?, in ON RISK AND DISASTER, supra note 3, at 199.  
 182.  Scales, supra note 3, at 9.  This commonly recognized phenomenon is known as 
the “gambler’s fallacy.”  Id.  
 183.  INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 29, at 114; see supra Part 
I.B.8 (describing disaster relief and overlap between disaster relief and private 
insurance); infra Part II.E.  
 184.  MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 154, at 3; INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS, supra note 29, at 114–15.  
 185.  See supra Part I.B.8; infra Part II.E (discussing disaster relief and the overlap 
between FEMA aid and flood insurance). 
 186.  See, e.g., Mary’s Story: “I Was Able to Rebuild My Home”, FLOODSMART.GOV, 
www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/videos/video_index.jsp (last visited Sept. 16, 
2014); Brochure, FEMA, The Benefits of Flood Insurance Versus Disaster Assistance 
(Nov. 1, 2012), available at www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1643-20490-
9801/f_217_benefits_30nov2012_web.pdf [hereinafter FEMA, Comparison Information 
Brochure]. 
 187. See FEMA, Comparison Information Brochure, supra note 186 (“You are in 
control.  Flood insurance claims are paid even if a disaster is not declared by the 
President.”).   
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Some people have not taken advantage of the “bargain,” perhaps 
because they have not realized that the insurance is subsidized.188  
Similarly, some might think that the seemingly isolated and limited risk 
of “flood” is just not worth spending money on, whereas if “flood” was 
bundled with other risks, it might seem worthwhile to spend money on 
it.189  Together with the other factors summarized above, it may not seem 
like a bargain at all.190  Moreover, the increased risk of floods associated 
with climate change may collide in some people’s minds with the denial 
of climate change; thus, the increased risk of floods is denied along with 
climate change.191 
C.  Unintended Consequences:  Development in Flood-Prone Areas 
and Incentives to Not Renovate Older Homes 
While one goal of the NFIP was to limit development in 
floodplains, there is widespread agreement that the NFIP has contributed 
to development in flood-prone areas and has created incentives for not 
 
 188. The premium rate sheet includes a summary that indicates whether the policy 
receives a subsidy, but homeowners may not focus on this information.  See Mary Ellen 
Klas, Homeowners Should Do Their Homework When Reviewing Flood Insurance Rates, 
MIAMI HERALD BLOG (Oct. 5, 2013, 9:29 AM), 
http://miamiherald.typepad.com/nakedpolitics/2013/10/homeowners-should-do-their-
homework-when-reviewing-flood-insurance-rates.html.  
 189. INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13 (describing bundling approach).  
See generally Kunreuther, supra note 181; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
08–7, NATURAL DISASTERS: PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE FEDERAL ROLE 
IN NATURAL CATASTROPHE INSURANCE (2007) [hereinafter GAO, 2007 NATURAL 
CATASTROPHE INSURANCE REPORT].  
 190. Yet another contributor to the low demand may be the way flood insurance is 
sold.  Private companies sell most of it, although it can be obtained directly from the 
NFIP.  See INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13.  As noted above, the federal 
government retains all the underwriting risk.  Id. (describing this approach as “unique”).  
Private insurance companies receive a fixed commission for each policy sold and a 
portion of the claims costs.  Scales, supra note 3, at 14–15; KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-
KERJAN, supra note 3, at 85–86.  The idea behind this marketing structure was that 
private insurance companies are much better at selling insurance than the government, 
thus, having companies sell flood policies would increase participation in the program.  
Scales, supra note 3, at 14–15.  Because private companies were not selling flood 
coverage anyway, this would not create conflicts for private companies.  However, this 
has not increased participation as much as was predicted for reasons that are not 
altogether clear.  KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 85–86.  The Rand 
study on market penetration notes that one of the most predictive factors for whether 
flood policies are sold is whether there are a lot of other flood policies sold in a particular 
area.  DIXON, ET AL., supra note 99, at 38.  This suggests that insurance agents and 
companies sell flood insurance only if they are familiar with it from other policies.  
 191.  See generally Connie Roser-Renouf et al., Engaging Diverse Audiences with 
Climate Change: Message Strategies For Global Warming’s Six Americas, in 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENT AND COMMUNICATION (Ander Hansen & 
Robert Cox eds., forthcoming Mar. 2015) [hereinafter Engaging Diverse Audiences with 
Climate Change]. 
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replacing older buildings in these areas.192  Rather than guiding 
development away from flood-prone areas, the NFIP has encouraged 
development in these areas and tried to make construction there safer.193 
The federalist structure of the U.S. government contributes to this 
result.  Land-use planning is primarily a local and state issue.194  So, 
although the NFIP offered subsidized insurance to communities that 
passed acceptable floodplain regulations,195 it did not provide a way for 
the federal government to make sure that communities enforced those 
regulations.196  Building codes are often poorly enforced in flood-prone 
areas.197  Local land-use regulators sometimes respond to pressure to 
favor development to support economic growth.198  The threat of takings 
litigation in opposition to land-use regulation has not subsided in recent 
years.199  Emblematic of this structural issue, the number of properties 
suffering repetitive flood losses has continued to increase.200 
 
 192. FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., supra note 105, at x, 9, 12–14 (estimating that $1 
billion of damage from floods is prevented every year by the flood program, but that the 
NFIP had not guided development away from floodplains and had created incentives for 
building and not replacing older buildings in flood-prone areas); Scales, supra note 3, at 
13; Houck, supra note 97, at 73, 160; William J. Siffin, Bureaucracy, Entrepreneurship, 
and Natural Resources: Witless Policy and the Barrier Islands, 1 CATO J. 293, 296 (1981) 
(describing how federal insurance encouraged building on Padre island in Texas).  One 
report finds that the NFIP has not stimulated development or increased flood losses since 
its new construction rules require mitigation which reduces flood losses. SARMIENTO & 
MILLER, supra note 118, at x.  The report also finds that the subsidized rates for older 
homes in flood-prone areas inflates their value and “essentially [provides] an incentive 
against redevelopment.”  Id.; see supra Part I.B.7. 
 193. FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., supra note 105, at xii, 12–16.  
 194. Scales, supra note 3, at 12; Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 8–11.  
 195. Scales, supra note 3, at 8.  The 1973 amendments required that federal assistance 
for construction projects in floodplain areas had to be backed by flood insurance.  42 
U.S.C. § 4012(a) (2012).  This was added when the 1968 Act was not resulting in 
communities joining the program.  Houck, supra note 97, at 71.  
 196. See supra Part I.A.4; Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 9; see, e.g., United 
States v. Parish of St. Bernard, 756 F.2d 1116, 1127 (5th Cir. 1985) (limiting remedies of 
the United States against Louisiana public and private defendants for violating their 
obligations to adopt and enforce flood control measures thus leading to massive flood 
damage).   
 197. See, e.g., KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 17; Klein & Zellmer, 
supra note 66, at 1496–1498.  
 198. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 17.  
 199. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property 
Rights, and Time, 73 LA. L. REV. 69, 105–06 (2012); Klein & Zellmer, supra note 66, at 
1513; Justin Pidot, Fees, Expenditures, and the Takings Clause, 41 ECOLOGY L. Q. 131, 
140–41; THE NATION’S RESPONSES, supra note 16, at 85; Kildow & Scorse, supra note 
22. 
 200. GAO, 2011 PUBLIC POLICY GOALS REPORT, supra note 26, at 6 (reporting that the 
number of repetitive loss properties rose from 76,202 in 1997 to 132,100 in March 2011).  
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New construction in high-risk areas must conform to elevation 
requirements as mentioned earlier,201 and most new buildings constructed 
in flood zones meet these standards.202  Existing buildings, by contrast, 
do not need to meet elevation or other requirements unless reconstruction 
or repair work worth more than 50 percent of the market value is being 
done on the property.203  This creates incentives to forego expensive 
renovations so property owners are not required to rebuild to code.204  
Because below-cost insurance is available for older homes relative to 
their risk, many times insurance payouts supply funds for owners to 
continue to occupy the same risky buildings.205  U.S. flood insurance has 
created negative incentives to pay for flood mitigation upgrades.206  
Furthermore, the subsidy to older homes has artificially inflated their 
value and contributed to them not being replaced by newer, more flood-
resistant structures.207  When Congress created the NFIP in 1968, it 
expected that old, flood-prone buildings would disappear from 
floodplains within 25 years, but this not what has happened.208 
Approximately 3.5 million older properties remain, with an extremely 
low turnover rate.209  Moreover, federal programs have created levees 
and taken other measures to make areas “safe” to build.210 
Despite the legislative goal of guiding development away from 
floodplains, the opposite has happened:  development on floodplains has 
been fostered and has flourished in part due to the NFIP and related 
programs.  Some of this development is more flood-resistant than it 
would be without the NFIP, but local building codes are often lightly 
enforced, leading to newly-constructed, at-risk property.  This 
development has resulted in increasing amounts of property at risk, 
higher costs for the NFIP, and higher disaster relief costs.  In short, 
although certainly not the only factor at work, the program has 
contributed to more development in flood-prone areas and to the 
retention, rather than the replacement, of older homes.  As a 
consequence, more property is at risk of floods. 
 
 201. INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13.  
 202. FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., supra note 105, at xi, 16.  
 203. See 44 C.F.R. §§ 59.1, 60.3(c)(2) (2014). 
 204. FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., supra note 105, at 23. 
 205. Id.  
 206. Id.  
 207. SARMIENTO & MILLER, supra note 118, at x. 
 208. FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., supra note 105, at 22.   
 209. Id. at 23. 
 210. See, e.g., Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 10–12; FRENCH WETMORE ET 
AL., supra note 105, at 25–26; supra Parts I.A.4, I.B.7. 
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D.  Problematic Mapping and a Confusing Structure 
Technical issues have endured throughout the history of the NFIP.  
In 1985, Oliver Houck observed that Congress had not wholeheartedly 
committed to the NFIP and claimed that, for it to work well, it needed 
sufficient resources for mapping, rate-setting, and enforcement.211  
Mapping has been a chronic issue, as maps are often outdated and 
inaccurate.212  According to the GAO, more attention to rate-setting 
continues to be needed.213  Local pushback to map changes has often 
been intense, sometimes resulting in map revisions.214  In addition, 
FEMA has not kept track of grandfathered properties or other important 
data.215 
Moreover, the NFIP’s structure is far from intuitive or self-
explanatory.  Because the insurance is sold by private companies, it 
probably is not clear to many policyholders that the federal government 
actually is insuring them.  Public understanding of basic insurance 
principles is often lacking.216  Further, it likely is not apparent to many 
potential buyers why the federal government is the insurer in this 
context; namely, that the basic coverage has not been available on the 
private market.217  Because the insurance is provided by the federal 
government, consumer-friendly state insurance law doctrines do not 
apply.218 
E.  The Situation in 2012 
The effects of federal disaster relief on insurance purchase decisions 
and other actions have not been fully explored.219  Given the publicity 
around federal disaster relief and the overlap between federal disaster 
housing assistance and benefits provided by flood insurance, it would not 
be surprising if some homeowners in flood-prone areas decided not to 
 
 211. Houck, supra note 97, at 159–163. 
 212. GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 7; 
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 16; Hornstein, supra note 3, at 34.    
 213. GAO, 2008 FEMA’S RATE-SETTING PROCESS REPORT, supra note 65, at 30. 
 214.  Id. at 16–17; Hornstein, supra note 3, at 25–26; Luke & Abramovsky, supra 
note 3, at 9–10.  
 215. GAO, 2008 FEMA’S RATE-SETTING PROCESS REPORT, supra note 65, at 20; 
GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 31–32. 
 216. See Americans Believe They’re Savvy About Insurance, but NAIC Insurance IQ 
Tells Different Story, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONER’S (May 10, 2009), 
http://www.naic.org/Releases/2009_docs/insurance_iq.htm (providing data indicating 
that majority of respondents expressed confidence about their insurance knowledge, but 
most received a failing score of 40% on a basic ten-question insurance IQ test).  
 217. See supra Part II.B.  
 218. Scales, supra note 3, at 33, 38. 
 219. See supra Part I.B.8. 
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buy flood insurance, or let their policies lapse, because they assumed 
federal disaster assistance would pay for their losses.220  Of those who 
did purchase policies prior to 2012, over one million flood insurance 
policies were heavily subsidized, and the other four million were priced 
at rates that did not reflect flood risk, under the NFIP’s solidaristic goal 
of providing flood insurance to those who could not otherwise acquire it. 
But the NFIP, unsurprisingly, had not met the conflicting actuarial 
goal of saving the federal government money.  Rather than guiding 
development away from floodplains, it had encouraged development 
there and discouraged the replacement or renovation of older buildings.  
Localities and states often did not enforce building codes that might 
lessen flood damage, and the NFIP could do little about it.  Thousands of 
properties had been mitigated with FEMA funds, reducing flood 
damages by an estimated $1 billion a year.  But disaster relief costs, 
rather than decreasing, had increased dramatically. 
Expensive subsidies on high-risk properties and storms had led to 
large deficits.  Although deficits were anticipated when the program 
started, the idea that the program should be self-supporting had long ago 
taken hold as part of an increasingly popular market approach to 
government.221  The NFIP had been on the GAO’s high-risk list since 
2006.  Flood risk mapping, the basis for determination of rates, was 
inadequate. 
The federal government in 1968 chose to insure a risk that is 
extremely difficult to insure by offering a product that people have to be 
forced to buy even when it is offered at a steep discount.  Federal disaster 
relief overlapped with flood insurance benefits.  The overall assessment 
of the NFIP was mixed at best, particularly given that more frequent and 
destructive storms were predicted. 
III.  THE 2012 AND 2014 REFORMS 
A.   The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 
The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act (“BW-12”), the 
most significant revision to the NFIP in at least 20 years, was passed 
with bipartisan support by a wide margin and signed by President Obama 
in July 2012.222  It reflected an actuarial approach to flood insurance and 
 
 220. See supra Part I.B.8. 
 221. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF 
MARKETS 6–8, 11 (2012). 
 222. Hornstein, supra note 3, at 30; Andrew G. Simpson, Agents, Insurers Cheer 
Congress OK of Flood Insurance Reform Bill, INS. J. (June 29, 2012), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/nahona/2012/06/29/253845.htm.  BW-12 was 
part of a large transportation bill and was uncontroversial at the time of passage.  Bruce 
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was aimed at making the NFIP fiscally stable and self-supporting.223  It 
gradually eliminated all subsidies and called for the creation of a reserve 
fund so that, ideally, taxpayers would not be called on to periodically bail 
out the NFIP.224  It expanded mapping funds and authorized funding of 
the NFIP for the next five years.225  An alliance between 
environmentalists concerned about climate change, insurance companies, 
and market-oriented reformers who want a smaller federal government 
contributed to the 2012 revisions.226 
The 2012 flood insurance revisions arose from years of deliberation.  
The GAO had raised concerns about the fiscal stability of the NFIP 
almost from the beginning.227  Researchers studying the NFIP had long 
been calling for the removal of subsidies so that landowners in flood-
prone areas would bear the costs of the risks they encountered and so that 
a private market for flood insurance could develop.228  The law’s 
orientation towards risk-based rates and market participation was part of 
the broad move towards markets in public policy over the past few 
decades.229  Various GAO reports contain many of the recommendations 
that became part of BW-12; furthermore, legislation similar to BW-12 
had been introduced and even passed the House earlier.230  This section 
outlines the most important aspects of BW-12. 
 
Alpert, How Controversial Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Bill Became Law, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (Aug. 13, 2013, 5:14 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/08/how_controversial_biggert-wate.html.  
 223. FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7. 
 224. NAIC Overview, supra note 7.  
 225. Id. 
 226. Eli Lehrer, Strange Bedfellows: Smartersafer.org and the Biggert-Waters Act of 
2012, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 351, 352 (2013) (describing coalition).   
 227. See GAO, 2006 FLOOD INSURANCE HIGH-RISK REPORT, supra note 7, at 5–6 
(stating that GAO has raised concerns for 15 years).  
 228. See, e.g., Kunreuther, supra note 181, at 184, 191, 198; KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-
KERJAN, supra note 3, at 193–203.  For years there has been some private insurance 
available for floods above the NFIP limits.  Id. at 371 n.21, 373 n.26; see infra Part 
IV.B.3.  
 229. See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 221, at 7–8, 11.  
 230. See generally, e.g., GAO, 2011 ACTION NEEDED REPORT, supra note 68; GAO 
2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED  REPORT, supra note 59; GAO, 2008 FEMA’S RATE-
SETTING PROCESS REPORT, supra note 65.  Prior bills included Flood Insurance Reform 
and Modernization Act of 2006, H.R. 4973,109th Cong. (as passed by House, June 27, 
2006); Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization Act of 2006, S. 3589,109th Cong. (as 
introduced by Sen. Richard Shelby, June 28, 2006).   
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1.   Highlights of the 2012 Reforms 
a.  Eventual Subsidy Elimination, Risk-Based Rates, and an  
 Actuarial Approach 
The 2012 reforms required that all subsidies eventually would be 
phased out.  As noted above, there were about one million subsidized 
policies when these reforms passed.231  The most immediate subsidy 
phase-outs were those for second homes, businesses, and severe 
repetitive loss properties.232  The 2012 reforms phased out those 
subsidies starting January 1, 2013, with rates rising 25 percent a year 
until they reflected full-risk pricing.233  Subsidized rates for older homes 
(pre-FIRM properties) that were primary residences would stay in effect 
until the property was sold.234  A “sale trigger” provision required that 
risk-based rates would be applied to these older homes once they were 
sold.235  BW-12 also would have eventually eliminated subsidies for 
houses that received subsidies based on mapping changes, known as 
grandfathered properties.236 
 
 231.  GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 1. 
 232.  FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7.  Policy holders who had subsidized 
policies for non-primary residences, businesses, and severe repetitive loss properties (a 
total of 5% of flood policyholders) received 25% premium increases starting January 1, 
2013.  Id.  BW-12 eliminated subsidies for 438,000 policyholders, for second homes, 
businesses, and severe repetitive loss properties as of January 1, 2013.  GAO, 2013 
SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.  But 715,000 subsidized properties 
remained.  Id.  “Severe repetitive loss” properties are defined as single family residences 
which have suffered flood damage for which four or more claims have been made, each 
greater than $5000 or at least two claims have been made with the total amount 
exceeding the value of the property.  42 U.S.C. § 4014(h)(1)(B) (2012). 
 233.  FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7; see supra note 232.  
 234.  The subsidy would stay in effect until the property was sold, unless it was a 
severe repetitive loss property, in which case the subsidy would begin to phase out in 
2013.  FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7; see supra note 232.  
 235.  42 U.S.C. § 4014 (g)(2) (2012) (repealed 2014); FEMA 2012 Overview, supra 
note 7.  FEMA had to consider catastrophic loss years in the calculation of the average 
historical loss year.  NAIC Overview, supra note 7.  Another area of the legislation 
concerned deductibles:  until FEMA developed updated ratemaps, deductibles would be 
between $1500 and $2000.  Hornstein, supra note 3, at 33; see Biggert-Waters Flood 
Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100210(b)(1)(A)–(B), 126 Stat. 
405, 921 (codified at 42. U.S.C. § 4019 (2012)).  After the FEMA maps were updated, 
the deductibles were to be revised.  Hornstein, supra note 3, at 33.  Some subsidized 
policyholders are not required to supply data on their flood risk so FEMA is asking them 
to supply information voluntarily.  GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra 
note 3, at 4; see § 100205, 126 Stat. at 917–19 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4014–4015).  
 236.  FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7.  These provisions were not implemented 
because the 2014 reforms eviscerated them.  See Homeowner Flood Insurance 
Affordability Act of 2014, P.L. No. 113-89, § 4, 128 Stat. 1020, 1022 (to be codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 4015); infra Part III.B.1.  
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The basic idea was that flood risk maps would be revised and 
premiums would ultimately reflect the property location’s current risk of 
flooding, to take effect on the effective date of any revised or updated 
maps.237  New properties insured under the NFIP were to be charged 
“actuarial rates,” which means they would be charged rates that reflected 
the actual risk.  Risk-based rates would apply to new policies and 
situations where a policy had lapsed because of the policyholder’s 
“deliberate choice.”238  For subsidized homes currently insured under the 
NFIP, rates could rise 20 to 30 percent over five years until those rates 
also reflected actuarial risk.239  The 2012 reforms aimed to create a 
reserve fund, and all policies were to be increased to begin raising money 
for that reserve fund.240 
b.   “Affordability” Study 
BW-12 required eventual removal of all subsidies and for rates to be 
based only on flood risk.241  However, Congress included a provision in 
tension with the market-based framework of the reforms.  It required a 
study to be done by the National Academy of Sciences of methods to 
encourage and maintain participation in the NFIP, to educate consumers 
about the NFIP and flood risk, and to develop an “affordability 
framework” through “targeted assistance rather than generally subsidized 
rates including means-tested vouchers.”242  The 2012 reforms required 
that the study would include a cost-benefit analysis of a flood insurance 
program with full risk-based premiums and means-tested assistance for 
those who cannot afford insurance, as compared to the existing system of 
 
 237.  The statute provided that “any property located in an area that is participating in 
the national flood insurance program shall have the risk premium rate charged for flood 
insurance on such property adjusted to accurately reflect the current risk of flood to such 
property, subject to any other provision of this Act.”  42 U.S.C. § 4015(h) (2012) 
(repealed 2014).  
 238.  42 U.S.C. § 4014(g)(3) (2012) (repealed 2014). 
 239.  42 U.S.C. § 4015(h) (2012) (repealed 2014). 
Any increase in the risk premium charged for flood insurance on any property 
that is covered by a flood insurance policy on the effective date of such an 
update that is a result of such updating shall be phased in over a 5-year period, 
at the rate of 20 percent for each year following such effective date. 
Id.   
 240.  FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7.  
 241.  GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 11–12. 
 242.  Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12), Pub. L. 112-
141, § 100236, 126 Stat. 405, 957.  The GAO issued two reports in 2013 indicating that 
more information was needed on different types of properties and subsidies.  See 
generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-858T, NATIONAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE PROGRAM: CONTINUED ATTENTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS CHALLENGES (2013) 
[hereinafter GAO, 2013 ATTENTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS CHALLENGES REPORT]; GAO, 
2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 6. 
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subsidized flood insurance and “federal disaster relief for people without 
coverage.”243  The law specified that the study was supposed to be 
completed in 270 days.244 
The incomes and assets of those who currently benefit from the 
subsidies are difficult to ascertain.  A large majority of the remaining 
subsidies are in counties with high home values.  The GAO notes that 
“78.8% of subsidized policies are in counties that rank in the top 30% of 
home values while 1.03% are in counties that rank in the bottom 
30%.”245  Even in counties that rank high in overall home values, 
however, there are homes that are not as highly valued and these may be 
in the less desirable areas which may be the more flood-prone areas.  
Very specific data about owners’ incomes are not available, and the 
GAO states that “full-risk rates may be overly burdensome for some 
owners and not for others.”246 
c.  Improving Mapping and Grounding Maps in Science 
The 2012 reforms authorized $400 million annually to the national 
flood-mapping program.247  Congress directed FEMA to use the “most 
accurate . . . data” in developing maps, and areas within the 100-year and 
500-year floodplains, as well as “residual risk” areas, had to be 
 
 243.  § 100236(b), 126 Stat. at 957.  It is striking that Congress is here acknowledging 
that disaster relief and flood insurance cover the same territory.   
 244.  Id. § 100236(c).   
 245.  GAO, 2013 ATTENTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS CHALLENGES REPORT, supra note 
3, at 21 tbl.4.  These figures pertain to the 715,000 subsidized policies that remain after 
the second home, business, and severe repetitive loss properties have been removed.  
 246.  Id. at 36.  Proponents of continuing the subsidies have argued that they do not 
benefit the wealthy to the extent claimed by their opponents.  See generally, e.g., Jeff 
Harrington, Op-ed, Political Rhetoric That Subsidized Flood Insurance Rates Help Rich 
Doesn't Mesh with Reality, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 13. 2013, 5:15 PM), 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/banking/political-rhetoric-that-subsidized-
flood-insurance-rates-help-rich-doesnt/2157000.  Proponents of eliminating the subsidies 
have argued to the contrary.  See generally, e.g., R.J. Lehmann, Letter to the Editor, 
Sifting Flood Program Data, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 20, 2013, 2:19 PM),  
http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/letters/saturdays-letters-work-to-rid-the-world-of-
nuclear-weapons/2157987; Carolyn Kousky & Howard Kunreuther, Addressing 
Affordability in the National Flood Insurance Program, 1 J. EXTREME EVENTS 1 (2014); 
R.J. Lehmann, About Those ‘Huge’ Flood Insurance Rate Increases, R STREET (Nov. 4, 
2013), http://www.rstreet.org/2013/11/04/about-those-huge-flood-insurance-rate-
increases/ (arguing rate increases are not as extreme or widespread as opponents claim, 
and that if a risk-based rate is extremely high, this suggests the risk is extremely high and 
the price signal should be heeded).  
 247.  § 100216(f), 126 Stat. at 930 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4101b(f) (2012)) (granting 
authority to allocate $400 million annually between 2013 and 2017); Hornstein, supra 
note 3, at 33. 
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mapped.248  Appeals of mapping decisions were to be based only on their 
technical and scientific validity.249  The Act also created a Scientific 
Resolution Panel to address any mapping-related concerns raised by 
those who are dissatisfied with any appeal to FEMA.250  The aim of these 
provisions was to ensure that maps and rates are based on science and 
not subject to political pressure. 
d.  Other BW-12 Reforms 
The NFIP has long required that lenders in flood-prone areas make 
sure that borrowers have flood insurance because homeowners tend not 
to buy flood insurance voluntarily.251  As lenders have often failed to 
make sure homeowners have and keep flood insurance, the 2012 reforms 
increased civil penalties on lenders that fail to ensure borrowers have 
insurance and removed the time limit on annual penalties.252  The 2012 
reforms also consolidated the three FEMA mitigation programs and 
streamlined the process for release of mitigation grants.253 
BW-12 paid explicit attention to privatization in addition to the 
implicit aim of fostering the private market by removing subsidized 
rates.  First, it clarified that private flood insurance met the flood 
insurance purchase requirement that went along with mortgages.254  It 
also required FEMA and the GAO to conduct studies and report to 
Congress within 18 months with an assessment of the private insurance 
market’s capacity to assume a portion of the NFIP risk.255  BW-12 also 
 
 248.  § 100216(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(C), 126 Stat. at 927 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
4101b(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(C)); Hornstein, supra note 3 at 33.  Also relating to mapping 
issues, the Act mandates that FEMA contract with the National Academy of Public 
Administration to Conduct a study of coordination between FEMA and both federal and 
state agencies concerning the mapping program and requires the Office of Management 
and Budget to submit a report to Congress that specifically highlights budget issues 
involving mapping when proposing FEMA’s annual budget.  § 100220(a)(2), 126 Stat. at 
933 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4101c(a)(2)).  
 249.  § 100218(a), 126 Stat. at 930–31 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4104-1(a)(2)(A)); 
Hornstein, supra note 3, at 34.  
 250.  § 100218(a), 126 Stat. at 930 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4104-1(a)(1)). 
 251.  See supra Part I.B.4.  
 252.  FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., supra note 105, at, 23–24; NAIC Overview, supra 
note 7.  
 253.  FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7. 
 254.  NAIC Overview, supra note 7.  It required the Federal Office of Insurance to 
report to Congress on the state of the private market for natural catastrophe insurance.  Id. 
 255.  These studies have been done.  See generally GAO, 2014 PRIVATE SECTOR 
INVOLVEMENT REPORT, supra note 4; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-179, 
HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE: MULTIPLE CHALLENGES MAKE EXPANDING PRIVATE 
COVERAGE DIFFICULT (2014). 
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made clear that the NFIP had the authority to buy reinsurance to cover 
catastrophic losses, which it had not done in the past.256 
BW-12 also called for various studies, including a study of flood 
risk determinations behind levees, a study of the private market for 
natural catastrophe insurance, and a GAO study of subsidized 
properties.257 
2.   Summary of the 2012 Reforms 
In BW-12 Congress moved from a solidaristic system of 
homeowners’ flood insurance towards an actuarial approach with risk-
based rates to be phased in over time.258  It specifically rejected the past 
practice of having generally subsidized rates but indicated it was 
concerned with flood insurance costs by requiring a study of methods to 
develop an affordability framework.259  It shifted from an approach to 
mapping that was vulnerable to political pressure to one that would be 
based only on scientific principles.  Congress strengthened provisions to 
ensure demand, added a reserve fund plan, and took steps to encourage 
private insurance.  The gradual shift to risk-based pricing was seen as a 
positive move which would lead to market rates and private competition, 
both seen as good things.  Market rates based on risk would more 
accurately reflect the costs of the risks faced by living in flood-prone 
areas, and this too was widely seen as a beneficial change. 
B.  The Menendez-Grimm Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability 
Act of 2014 
Less than two years after the 2012 reforms, Congress did a partial 
about-face, departing from the actuarial approach it had so recently 
adopted, by passing the Menendez-Grimm Homeowners Flood Insurance 
Affordability Act of 2014 (“MG-14”).  MG-14 accepted some of the 
subsidy rollbacks, such as the second home subsidy rollbacks, and 
retrenched others such as the subsidy for old homes that were primary 
 
 256.  NAIC Overview, supra note 7; GAO, 2011 ACTION NEEDED REPORT, supra note 
68, at 6.  
 257.  Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12), Pub. L. No. 112-
141, § 100231(a)(3), (c), (e)(1)(A), 126 Stat. 405, 949–50, 951, 952.  The levee study, 
subsidized property study, and private market study have been completed.  NAT’L ACAD. 
SCIS., Levee Report, supra note 30; GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra 
note 3, at 1, 9; GAO, 2014 PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT REPORT, supra note 4.    
 258.  See supra Part II.A–E.  
 259.  See supra Part II.C.  
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residences.260  It also did not change the 2017 reauthorization date of the 
program put in place by Congress during the 2012 reforms.261 
1.  Highlights of the 2014 Reforms 
a.  “Striving” to Limit Premium Prices 
MG-14 requires that FEMA must “strive to minimize the number of 
policies [that have premiums which] exceed one percent of the total 
coverage provided by the policy.”262  In other words, FEMA must strive 
to make sure a policy with $250,000 of coverage does not have 
premiums of more than $2500 per year, regardless of the flood risk of the 
property. 
b. Subsidies:  Reinstatement of Some and Continuing Gradual  
 Elimination of Others 
i.  Some Subsidies Are Reinstated and a Surcharge is Added to  
 All Policies. 
MG-14 restores the subsidies on older homes (pre-FIRM subsidies) 
and the grandfathering subsidies.263  It requires refunds to homeowners 
who paid higher rates as a result of the 2012 law for homes that are 
primary residences and are not severe repetitive loss properties.264  These 
subsidies cover 715,000 subsidized properties and by definition include 
many of the highest risk properties.265 
 
 260.  Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 
1(a), 128 Stat. 1020, 1020 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4001 note).  
 261.  § 100203(a), 126 Stat. at 916 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4016(a) (2012)); National 
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS, 
http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_nfip.htm (last updated Nov. 13, 204); see Dan 
Farber, Sea Level Rises, Premiums Not so Much, LEGAL PLANET BLOG (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://legal-planet.org/2014/03/24/sea-level-rises-premiums-not-so-much.  
 262.  § 7(j), 128 Stat. at 1023 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4015).  FEMA must 
report to Congress when it fails to meet this goal.  Id.   
 263.  Id. § 4 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4015) (“Restoration of Grandfathered 
Rates”). This provision repealed § 1308 of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4015(h)), which required premium adjustments to reflect the 
current risk of flood based on updated maps, and stated that premiums could rise 20% per 
year following new flood maps.  Id.; National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 
4015(h) (2012) (repealed 2014).   
 264.   The new law provided that some policyholders receive refunds of higher 
premiums paid under the 2012 reforms.  Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act: 
Overview, FEMA.GOV 2 (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/1396551935597-
4048b68f6d695a6eb6e6e7118d3ce464/HFIAA_Overview_FINAL_03282014.pdf 
[hereinafter FEMA 2014 Overview].  
 265.  GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.  
WRIGGINS FINAL [SEND TO PRINT] (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  3:26 PM 
2014] FLOOD MONEY 405 
When Congress passed the 2012 reforms requiring that rates should 
be based on risk, FEMA did not have the information needed to 
determine full risk rates for policies that no longer qualified for 
subsidies.266  Subsidized rates were about 35–45 percent of what 
actuarially sound rates would have been.267  FEMA therefore used a 
working assumption that subsidized rates were about half of what full-
risk rates would be.268  FEMA tried to raise rates gradually and develop 
maps at the same time.269 
The 2012 reforms required that premiums be adjusted to reflect the 
current risk of flood based on updated maps and stated that premiums 
could rise 20–30 percent per year following new flood maps.270  But 
MG-14 stopped those increases for homes that are primary residences.  
Under MG-14, rates still can increase for subsidized properties by five 
percent a year, and, with limited exceptions, rates cannot increase more 
than 18 percent per year.271  The 2014 law added a surcharge to all 
policies to offset the cost of the subsidized policies.272 
ii.  Subsidies Remain when Subsidized Properties Are Sold and  
 when Subsidized Policies Have Lapsed. 
Congress, in order to reduce the number of subsidized properties, 
passed a “sale trigger” provision in 2012, so that, when a property that 
benefited from a subsidized flood insurance policy was sold, the rates 
would shift to market rates for the new owner.273  The real estate industry 
objected strenuously once this provision went into effect.274  MG-14 
repealed the sale trigger provision so that new owners of primary 
residences in flood-prone areas will receive the existing subsidies.275 
 
 266.  GAO, 2011 ACTION NEEDED REPORT, supra note 68, at 52; GAO, 2013 
SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 30–32.   
 267.  See supra note 68; Part I.A.4. 
 268.   GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 30–32 (2013); 
FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7.   
 269.  FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7.   
 270.  Id.   
 271.  FEMA 2014 Overview, supra note 264, at 2.  
 272.  Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 
8, 128 Stat. 1020, 1023–24 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4015a, 4017a).  $25 was added 
to each primary residence and $250 to all other policies.  Id. § 8(a) (to be codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 4015a(b)(1)–(2)); FEMA 2014 Overview, supra note 264, at 3. 
 273.  See supra note 232 and accompanying text.  
 274.  Robert R. M. Verchick & Lynsey R. Johnson, When Retreat Is the Best Option: 
Flood Insurance after Biggert-Waters and other Climate Change Puzzles, 47 J. Marshall 
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 18, 23), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2418089; see infra Part III.C.2.a. 
 275.  § 3(a)(1)(A), 128 Stat. at 1021 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014(g)).      
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Changes in the rules about when a subsidized policy lapses were 
also significant.  The 2012 reforms had stated that if a homeowner 
deliberately let his subsidized policy lapse, the subsidy would be gone 
and a new policy on the property would have to be based on risk.276  The 
2014 reforms were much more forgiving about situations when a policy 
lapsed.  They provided that if a policy had lapsed because the 
homeowner had been told she was no longer required to purchase flood 
insurance, the subsidy would continue.277 
iii.   Gradual Subsidy Elimination for Second Homes, Businesses,  
 and Severe Repetitive Loss Properties Will Continue. 
MG-14 leaves in place the gradual elimination of subsidies for 
second homes, businesses, and severe repetitive loss properties that was 
passed in 2012278 and provides that rates for those properties can rise by 
25 percent a year.279  Thus, if a person owns a second home that had been 
protected by an old house subsidy, that second home will gradually be 
charged actuarial, risk-based rates.  Similarly, if a person owns a severe 
repetitive loss property or a business that has a subsidized policy, that 
policy’s price gradually will rise to reflect flood risk.  A total of 438,000 
subsidized policies will gradually be shifted to risk-based rates.280 
c.   “Affordability” Study Expanded 
MG-14 significantly expands the provisions about affordability that 
were in the 2012 law. The 2012 reforms specified that the National 
 
 276.  See supra Part III.A.1.a.  
 277.  § 3(a)(1)(B), 128 Stat. at 1021 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014(g)(1)).  The 
new lapse provision states that rates will not rise to market rates if the policy lapsed 
because the policyholder was told she was no longer required to have coverage.  Id.  This 
shift is telling.  Remember we are talking about homeowners in high-risk areas who had 
deeply subsidized flood policies which lapsed, and considering whether they should be 
able to get new subsidized policies or sell their property to someone else with it being 
protected by a subsidized policy.  The 2012 version left the owner with some 
responsibility—if she deliberately let her subsidized policy lapse, she could not get it 
back.  By contrast, the 2014 version left the owner with much less responsibility—if she 
let the policy lapse because it was no longer required, she could get it back.  The owner 
had no independent responsibility to consider her own risk and buy insurance 
accordingly.  From an insurance perspective, this is not sensible.  If a policyholder of, 
say, a life insurance policy let it lapse, a market-based insurance company would assess 
the current risk when issuing a new policy and would not have to issue a policy based on 
rates from earlier.   
 278.  See supra Part III.A.1.a.  For definition of severe repetitive loss properties, see 
supra note 232.  
 279.  FEMA 2014 Overview, supra note 264, at 2.  
 280.  Id.; GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 13 (finding that 
subsidies for second homes, businesses, and severe repetitive loss properties total 
438,000).  
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Academy of Sciences would conduct a study of methods for establishing 
an affordability framework “through targeted assistance rather than 
general subsidies.”281  The report was not finished by the time FEMA 
began raising rates, which became a rallying cry for opponents who 
argued that rate increases should be postponed until the study was 
done.282  The Administrator of FEMA, Craig Fugate, testified without 
contradiction in September 2013 that it might take two years for the 
study to be completed and that he had no discretion to halt rate increases 
in the meantime.283 
The 2014 reforms added more money for the study and increased 
the requirements attached to it.  Now, the FEMA administrator must 
develop a draft framework to address “the issues of affordability of flood 
insurance sold under the National Flood Insurance Program, including 
issues identified in the affordability study.”284  The new statute lists a 
number of criteria that the Administrator must consider in preparing an 
 
 281.  Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 
100236(a), 126 Stat. 405, 957. 
 282. See, e.g., Bruce Alpert, GNO Report Says FEMA Should Delay Flood Insurance 
Premium Hikes Pending Affordability Study, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 11, 2013, 11:23 
AM), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/09/gno_report_says_fema_should_de.html; 
Romano, supra note 133.  The lawsuit filed by the Mississippi Insurance Commissioner 
against FEMA in September 2013 argues that this failure should halt all insurance rate 
increases.  Complaint at 29, Miss. Ins. Dep’t v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, No. 13-
CV-379 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 26, 2013); Bibeka Shrestha, Miss. Regulator Sues US Over 
Flood Insurance Rate Hikes, LAW360 (Sept. 27, 2013, 3:29 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/476231/miss-regulator-sues-us-over-flood-insurance-
rate-hikes. 
 283.  FEMA Administrator 2013 Written Testimony, supra note 81; Andrew G. 
Simpson, FEMA Chief Disappoints Senators, Says He Can’t Delay Flood Insurance 
Rates, INS. J. (Sept. 23, 2013), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2013/09/23/305915.htm.  Phase One of 
the study, to be undertaken by an ad hoc committee under the auspices of the National 
Academy of Sciences, began on January 30, 2014.  Project Information, NAT’L ACADS., 
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=49584 (last visited Oct. 16, 
2014) (“Project title:  Affordability of NFIP Premiums”).  The legislation does not 
require any particular outcome for the study, and the study itself at first glance seems that 
it will be unwieldy and challenging.  The focus area of the study, for example, is listed as 
follows: “Behavioral and Social Sciences; Computers and Information Technology; Earth 
Sciences; Engineering and Technology; Environment and Environmental Studies; Math, 
Chemistry and Physics.”  Id.  An ad hoc committee will prepare two reports for FEMA.  
The first will focus on definitions and assumptions related to an affordability framework, 
while the second will propose alternative approaches for evaluating options for 
affordability programs.  Id.  It will then be up to FEMA and Congress to decide what 
course to take on affordability issues.   
 284.  Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 
9(a), 128 Stat. 1020, 1024.  
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affordability framework, including the effect of rate increases on 
participation.285 
d.  More Congressional Oversight Added for Mapping 
The 2012 reforms were clear that mapping should be only based on 
scientific evidence.  The new law has added provisions that seem to be in 
tension with this principle.  For example, in developing the “affordability 
framework,” the FEMA administrator is required to consider “the impact 
flood insurance rate map updates have on the affordability of flood 
insurance.”286  Congress will review implementation of the mapping 
program,287 and new provisions have been added so that each member of 
Congress with constituents affected by map changes will have more 
information about the progress of the mapping process.288  Lastly, FEMA 
must pay for the costs of successful map appeals by homeowners.289 
e.  New Flood Insurance Advocate Position Created 
The 2014 reforms require FEMA to designate a Flood Insurance 
Advocate for the first time.  That person’s overall job is “to advocate for 
the fair treatment of policyholders under the National Flood Insurance 
Program and property owners in the mapping of flood hazards, the 
identification of risks from flood, and the implementation of measures to 
minimize the risk of flood.”290  The statute does not define “fair 
treatment.” 
f.  Variety in Policies and Clear Communication Encouraged 
MG-14 allows for more variety in policies by several means, 
responding to criticisms of the standard flood policy as one-size-fits-
all.291  It encourages high-deductible policies, which presumably would 
 
 285.  Id. § 9(b). 
 286.  Id. § 9(b)(5). 
 287.  Id. § 17. 
 288.  Id.  
 289.  § 18, 128 Stat. at 1027 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4017(a), 4104(f)).  
 290.  Id. § 24.  The duties of the advocate will include educating policyholders and 
property holders on flood and flood insurance related matters, assisting policyholders in 
understanding the program and understanding how to appeal preliminary rate maps, 
assisting in developing regional capacity to respond to individual concerns about flood 
insurance, coordinate outreach and education with local officials and community leaders 
in areas affected by proposed map changes, and aid policyholders in obtaining accurate 
information about rates.  Id.   
 291.  This criticism was made by Kevin Boyle, Managing Editor of the Rockaway 
Wave newspaper, at a panel at Columbia University Center for Climate Change on 
December 4, 2013.  Kevin Boyle, Soaring Flood Insurance Rates: Should Congress Step 
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be cheaper than low-deductible policies.292  Second, it requires that an 
owner’s flood mitigation activities, which are not part of the structure 
itself, be taken into account in determining rates.293  Third, it does not 
require that detached structures be insured for flood.294  The NFIP is 
required to clearly communicate flood risk information to policyholders 
even if they have subsidized policies under the new law.295 
2.  Summary of 2014 Reforms 
In MG-14, Congress retreated from eventual elimination of all 
subsidies as called for in 2012 but did continue with the gradual 
elimination of 438,000 subsidized policies, namely those for second 
homes, businesses, and severe repetitive loss properties.  715,000 
subsidies were reinstated, specifically those for older homes and 
grandfathered homes that are primary residences.  These subsidies were 
for old houses built without flood risk in mind and for properties where 
flood risk had increased but the properties had received lower rates in the 
past.  While Congress had called for a study of affordability and 
participation in 2012, the 2014 reforms expanded both the funding for 
and the requirements of the study.  Congress instructed the NFIP to 
“strive” to limit premium prices to one percent of the coverage, even if 
that was far below what a risk-based premium would be.  The mapping 
provisions of the 2012 law, which called for scientific principles to 
determine mapping decisions, were not repealed, but several provisions 
of the law require more congressional oversight of the mapping process.  
The new law requires clear communication of flood risk to all 
policyholders and called for a new “Flood Insurance Advocate” to 
communicate with and advocate for policyholders.  With its 
reinstatement of most subsidies and focus on affordability, Congress 
retreated from its actuarial approach of 2012 and returned to its former 
broad solidaristic approach. 
 
In?, COLUM. L. SCH., http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-change/conferences-and-
events (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).    
 292.  § 12, 128 Stat. at 1025 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4013(d)) (amending 42 
U.S.C. § 4013 to provide that the Administrator shall make available policies with 
deductibles of up to and including $10,000). 
 293.  Id. § 14 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014(a)(1)(A)) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 
4014(a)(1)(A), titled “Accounting for Flood Mitigation Activities in Estimates of 
Premium Rates”). 
 294.  Id. § 13(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4012a). 
 295.  Id. § 28 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4015(l)). 
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C.  Lessons of Failed Reforms 
This section discusses first why the 2012 reforms were passed and 
why many of those reforms were repealed in 2014.  It is important to 
remember that while there are no easy solutions to the dilemmas 
presented by floods and climate change, nonetheless the NFIP and 
federal flood policy could be much improved, as discussed in Part IV.296 
1.  Why the 2012 Reforms Passed 
BW-12 passed with a large bipartisan majority and was signed by 
the President on July 6, 2012, three months before Superstorm Sandy hit 
the New York City metropolitan area.297  Congress seemed to have taken 
sensible steps gradually to move away from its much-criticized and 
expensive taxpayer subsidization of flood risk.  Four main reasons 
account for the changes.  First, the reforms were based on decades of 
criticism of the NFIP’s finances, and its actuarial, market-based approach 
chimed with a popular market-based approach to government.  Second, a 
broad coalition of groups with diverse concerns supported the reforms.  
Third, the groups that could be affected by risk-based rates were not 
paying attention to the legislation when it was pending.  Fourth, no 
hurricanes had caused massive floods recently. 
a.  Direct Response to Criticism and Reflection of Popular  
 Market-Based Approach 
The 2012 reforms were not surprising; they directly responded to 
decades of GAO reports and other criticism of the NFIP and its 
finances.298  The House had passed a version of these reforms in 2006; a 
similar bill was introduced in the Senate that same year.299  The reforms 
can be seen as part of an actuarial approach to government which has 
been gaining ground over the past few decades; under this approach, 
market reforms are seen as a positive, efficient development.300  The 
subsidy elimination would, for the most part, have been very gradual and 
grounded in scientifically sound maps, so the law did not seem like an 
 
 296.  The issues are hard for a host of reasons, including these:  (1) the type of risk is 
one that is hard to predict and that people tend to discount; (2) the damages caused if the 
risk comes to fruition are astronomical; (3) the federal government has carrots but no 
good sticks; (4) and it is very hard for a democratically-elected government to take away 
benefits once granted to people who vote.   
 297.  Verchick & Johnson, supra note 274 (manuscript at 21).   
 298.  See supra Part III.A.  
 299.  See supra notes 224–27 and accompanying text.    
 300.   See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 221, at 7–8, 11.  
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extreme measure.301  The law had a provision about the need for an 
affordability study, which reflected solidaristic concerns, but this was not 
a prominent part of the law at the time; it seemed clear that the general 
subsidies which had endured for decades eventually would be a thing of 
the past.302 
b.  Effective Advocacy by a Diverse Coalition of Groups 
An interesting coalition of environmental groups, insurance groups, 
and free market reformers, smartersafer.org, worked hard on getting the 
reforms passed.  The gradual move to risk-based rates, which would 
encourage the private market to insure for floods, appealed to all three 
groups.303  The final draft did not mention climate change, but with rates 
slated to eventually be determined based on risk, it seemed that Congress 
recognized the potential increased flood risk from climate change.304  All 
taxpayers eventually would benefit by a small amount since they no 
longer would be bailing out the NFIP, and eventually disaster relief costs 
might be reduced or their growth slowed. 
c.  Inattentiveness of Potentially Affected Parties 
Another reason the 2012 reforms passed is that they did not receive 
much attention at the time.  The flood insurance reforms were included 
in a lengthy transportation bill, and there was not a separate hearing on 
these provisions in 2012.305  Flood insurance reform was not even 
mentioned in President Obama’s signing statement.306  Senator Mary 
Landrieu of Louisiana noted at the time that the flood insurance law 
would need to be “fixed,” stated she regretted it did not have 
affordability provisions, and said that it would be impossible to vote 
against the bill in which it was included.307  Apart from Senator 
Landrieu’s statement, there were few objections from Congress.  Other 
 
 301.  See supra Part III.A.1.a. 
 302.  Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 
100236, 126 Stat. 405, 957; see supra Part III.A.1.b.  
 303.  Lehrer, supra note 226, at 352 (describing the coalition, SmarterSafer.org).    
 304.  See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 199, at 84. 
 305.  Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 
Stat. 405.  The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 was Title II of 
Division F in the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act.  Id. 
 306.  See President Obama Signs Bill to Create Jobs, Restore America’s 
Transportation System, WHITE HOUSE (July 9, 2012, 2:29 PM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/07/09/president-obama-signs-bill-create-jobs-
restore-americas-transportation-system. 
 307.  Alpert, supra note 222.  
WRIGGINS FINAL [SEND TO PRINT] (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  3:26 PM 
412 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:2 
representatives of coastal areas, constituents, and the real estate industry 
all seemed to be inattentive. 
Perhaps those who would be affected by the bill assumed it would 
not pass; the risk of its passage may have seemed like a low probability, 
high impact event—the kind of risk that behavioral economics tells us 
people routinely discount.  After the many years that Congress had been 
urged to reform the NFIP and did not do anything significant, observers 
may have thought that Congress would not actually pass consequential 
reforms in 2012. 
d.  Lack of Major Recent Storms or Floods 
A fourth factor contributing to the 2012 reforms is the lack of major 
hurricanes immediately prior to their passage.  Although Hurricane Irene 
in fall 2011 had been significant, there were no huge hurricanes or floods 
immediately prior to the passage of BW-12.  It seems safe to say that if 
Superstorm Sandy had struck in June 2012 rather than October 2012, the 
2012 reforms would not have passed.308  Sandy, with its devastating 
flood damage, focused attention on the hardships of floods to the 
individuals suffering them, rather than the more diffuse costs of the NFIP 
on which Congress focused when it passed the 2012 reforms. 
e.  The Popularity of Fiscal Stability as a Goal 
Some might argue that Congress, in requiring the gradual move 
towards risk-based rates, departed from the Flood Act’s goal of 
providing flood insurance “on reasonable terms and conditions”309 
without much public debate.  But on the other hand, the goal of 
providing flood insurance on “reasonable terms and conditions” could 
also mean providing insurance based on the actual risk of flood loss as 
the 2012 reforms required.  Such insurance might well be both 
reasonable, because it is based on actual risk, and unaffordable, because 
the flood risk may be high.  Congress seemed to recognize the possible 
contradiction between requiring actuarial rates and the original goals of 
the Flood Act by calling for the much-invoked “affordability study,” 
which seems to be based on solidaristic ideas rather than actuarial 
ones.310  Still, the dominant idea of the 2012 reforms was returning the 
NFIP to fiscal stability, a popular and seemingly modest goal at the time. 
 
 308.  Verchick & Johnson, supra note 274 (manuscript at 21). 
 309.  42 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2012). 
 310.  Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 
100236, 126 Stat. 405, 957. 
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2.  Why the 2012 Reforms Were Reformed in 2014 
In 2014, many of the reforms were modified, though as noted above 
some of the subsidy rollbacks have been maintained.  This section 
explores why many of the 2012 reforms were rescinded in 2014.  Four 
main reasons account for the changes:  (1) intense lobbying and pressure 
from affected people and industry, particularly in the wake of Hurricane 
Sandy; (2) individual narratives conveyed by superficial press attention 
that could not be countered by the pro-reform side; (3) common human 
responses to flood risk and climate change risk as predicted by 
behavioral economics; and (4) FEMA’s difficult situation and weak 
communications. 
a.  Intense Lobbying and Pressure from the Real Estate Industry  
 and Affected People and Groups 
Superstorm Sandy in October 2012 struck densely populated and 
politically powerful areas of New York and New Jersey three months 
after the 2012 reforms were signed.311  Many coastal high-flood-risk 
areas flooded, causing untold hardship, some loss of life, and billions of 
dollars of losses.  Many homes in these high-risk areas were older homes 
that had been receiving subsidized rates for almost 50 years and were 
scheduled to gradually move to risk-based rates when maps were 
revised.312  FEMA began releasing its draft maps and risk-based rates 
around that time.313  Some people in older homes in flood zones that had 
long been receiving subsidies learned that much higher rates were in 
store.314  Others found that newer homes in areas that were newly 
mapped as flood-prone areas also eventually would face much higher 
rates.315  Those affected organized grassroots opposition, starting with a 
Facebook page, to “stop FEMA now.”316  The New York and New Jersey 
opponents of rate increases joined forces with the Gulf Coast opponents, 
leading to a powerful opposition movement.317  Groups including the 
National Association of Homebuilders, the National League of Cities, 
and local and state governments all worked to overturn the 2012 
reforms.318 
 
 311.  Verchick & Johnson, supra note 274 (manuscript at 21).  
 312.  Id. (manuscript at 22).   
 313.  Id. (manuscript at 21). 
 314.  Id. (manuscript at 22). 
 315.  Id. 
 316.  Stop FEMA Now, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/StopFemaNow (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2014); STOP FEMA NOW, http://www.stopfemanow.com (last visited Oct. 
17, 2014). 
 317.  Verchick & Johnson, supra note 274 (manuscript at 22).  
 318.  Id. (manuscript at 23). 
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The “sale trigger” provision became a target.  When a house that 
had been receiving a subsidy was sold, the premium rate for the new 
owner would be risk-based, per the 2012 reforms.319  In fall 2013, the 
real estate industry began to claim this was destroying the nascent real 
estate recovery and industry lobbyists deluged Washington with 
complaints.320 
The financial beneficiaries of the 2012 reforms were taxpayers in 
general, who would cease bailing out the NFIP if its rates are based on 
risk.  Yet, although the group Taxpayers for Common Sense and other 
members of the coalition that supported the reforms worked hard to keep 
the reforms in place, their voices were faint compared with the scores of 
organized coastal residents and the real estate industry.321 
The arguments for subsidy continuation were rarely on the merits of 
why the subsidies should continue into their fifth decade when flood 
risks were increasing.  Instead, they focused only on how unaffordable 
the rate increases were and how they were allegedly hurting the housing 
market.322  One of the original sponsors of the law, Representative 
 
 319. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12), Pub. L. No. 112-
141, § 100205(a)(1)(B), 126 Stat. 405, 917 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014(g)(2) (2012)) 
(repealed 2014); see Part III.A.1.a (describing sale trigger provision).  
 320. See, e.g., Drew Harwell, Flood-Insurance Hikes Ravage Tampa Bay 
Neighborhood Home Sales, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 29, 2013, 8:46 PM), 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/realestate/flood-insurance-hikes-ravage-tampa-
bay-neighborhood-home-sales/2158922; Opinion,  Flooding Capitol Hill: Republicans 
Cave to the Realtors on Taxpayer Flood Insurance, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2014, 7:20 
PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304610404579403361900877906
?KEYWORDS=Flooding+Capitol+Hill+Republicans+cave+to+the+Realtors+on+taxpay
er+flood+insurance&mg=reno64-
wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB1000142405270230461040
4579403361900877906.html%3FKEYWORDS%3DFlooding%2BCapitol%2BHill%2BR
epublicans%2Bcave%2Bto%2Bthe%2BRealtors%2Bon%2Btaxpayer%2Bflood%2Binsur
ance.  
 321. See, e.g., Steve Ellis, Steve Ellis: Resist the Urge to Roll Back Flood Insurance 
Reforms, SUN HERALD, Oct. 7, 2013, at 11; Don’t Gut Flood Insurance Reform by 
Extending Subsidies!, R STREET (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.rstreet.org/outreach/dont-gut-
flood-insurance-reform-by-extending-subsidies-2/; 
Smartersafer.org: Flood Insurance Reforms Should be Modified – Not Abandoned, 
SMARTERSAFER.ORG (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.smartersafer.org/flood-
reform/smartersafer-org-flood-insurance-reforms-should-be-modified-not-abandoned; 
Lehmann, supra note 246.  
 322. See, e.g., Harwell, supra note 320; Tracie Mauriello, Rising Cost of Flood 
Insurance Inspires Bill, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE (Jan. 11, 2014, 10:29 PM), 
http://www.post-gazette.com/news/nation/2014/01/12/Rising-cost-of-flood-insurance-
inspires-bill/stories/201401120157; Warren Kulo, Palazzo Debunks Myths Surrounding 
Flood Insurance and Homeowners (Video), GULFLIVE.COM (Jan. 9, 2014, 1:55 PM), 
http://blog.gulflive.com/mississippi-press-
news/2014/01/palazzo_debunks_myths_surround.html (quoting Rep. Steven Palazzo of 
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Maxine Waters, puzzlingly framed the rate increases as “unintended 
consequences,” when rates based on risk, which in some cases would be 
much higher than subsidized rates, were exactly what the law required.323 
The result, keeping in place most of the subsidies, is not surprising 
under basic interest-group theory.  As Professor Amy Sinden notes, 
“[B]asic and well-accepted principles of interest-group theory predict 
that a group whose interests are diffuse and have less marginal impact on 
each individual member will have far more difficulty organizing into an 
effective pressure group than a smaller group in which each member 
suffers substantial economic harm.”324  Further, those affected brought a 
powerful “intensity of preference” to the process, presenting accounts of 
grievance and injustice.325  Under this theory, it is predictable that the 
more diffuse group of individuals and organizations who would benefit 
from the legislation were unable to mobilize the power to maintain the 
subsidy rollbacks.  This does not explain why Congress kept in place the 
gradual subsidy rollbacks for second homes, businesses, and severe 
repetitive loss properties, and interest-group theory does not of course 
explain every outcome.326  The next subsections may assist with that 
explanation. 
b.  Powerful Individual Narratives and Superficial Press Attention 
The debate about rolling back the 2012 reforms was often framed in 
the media and by politicians as a story of the middle class or working 
class homeowner being unable to pay for or sell her house because of the 
increased rates imposed without warning or justification by the big bad 
government.327  Stories melded the hardships caused by Superstorm 
Sandy with hardships stemming from flood insurance rate increases.328  
Representative Waters’s claim of “unintended consequences” was 
 
Mississippi) (“I’m hearing from teachers, veterans, people who work at the shipyards in 
support of our Navy.  These are everyday Americans.”).     
 323. See Daniel Newhauser & Emma Dumain, Flood Insurance Bill Goes Back to 
Rewrite, ROLL CALL (Feb. 26, 2014, 10:32 AM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/218/flood-
insurance-bill-postponed/ (quoting Rep. Maxine Waters) (stating that goal of the 2014 
revisions was to correct the “unintended consequences” of 2014 reforms).  
324.  Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in 
Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1438 (2005).   
325.  See generally DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, 104–07 (2003); Daniel A. 
Farber, Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions 4–5 (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Pub. 
Law, Research Paper No. 2396056 (2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2396056. 
 326. See generally Farber, supra note 325, at 4–5.   
 327. See, e.g., Harwell, supra note 320; Mauriello, supra note 322; Kulo, supra note 
322. 
 328. See infra notes 329–35 and accompanying text.  
WRIGGINS FINAL [SEND TO PRINT] (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  3:26 PM 
416 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:2 
parroted by reporters,329 displaying an unfortunate example of how that 
label tends to stunt analysis of policy in favor of facile conclusions.330 
If homeowners had not purchased flood insurance protecting their 
homes and possessions from Sandy’s damage, this decision often was 
blamed on the government.  One article, for example, was titled “Federal 
Maps Left New York Unprepared for Sandy—and FEMA Knew It!”331  
It showcased a Queens couple with a house very near the ocean who let 
their flood policy lapse a few months before Sandy because they had not 
made a claim in 20 years and their house was not in a high-risk zone.  It 
did not mention that insurance outside a high-risk flood zone would have 
been much cheaper than insurance in a high-risk flood zone, that FEMA 
had recommended people outside high-risk zones buy flood insurance, or 
that FEMA had for decades been trying to get more money for its 
mapping program.332  It did not present homeowners as responsible for 
their decisions not to purchase insurance.  The story had a victim (middle 
class, white homeowner) and a villain (the federal government, 
specifically FEMA).333  Nor did media coverage include context such as 
the nature, length, effects of or original intent of the subsidies.334  Nor did 
they refer to how building codes often are lightly enforced in coastal 
regions, leading to more property at risk.335  They did not mention the 
incentive effects of the subsidies, such as promoting building in flood-
prone areas or discouraging large renovations or flood mitigation 
projects.336  They presented solidaristic notions of how flood insurance 
should be priced (not too high) but did not present a reason for that 
conclusion. 
Press stories from Florida and elsewhere featured claims from real 
estate organizations and brokers that the new flood insurance law was 
ravaging the just recovering real estate market.337  Press articles did not 
question whether these claims were accurate.  The R Street Institute, one 
 
 329. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Popular Flood Insurance Law is Target for Both 
Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2014, at A14 (“It appears to be another Washington story of 
unintended consequences.”).   
 330. See generally Martha T. McCluskey, How the “Unintended Consequences” 
Story Promotes Unjust Intent and Impact, 22 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 21 (2012). 
 331. Christie Thompson et al., Fed Flood Maps Left NY Unprepared for Sandy – and 
FEMA Knew It, WNYC.ORG (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.wnyc.org/story/fed-flood-maps-
left-ny-unprepared-sandy-and-fema-knew-it.  
 332. See, e.g., Houck, supra note 97.  The Rockaway Wave newspaper kept up a 
steady drumbeat of information and advocacy against flood insurance rate increases.  
Boyle, supra note 291.  
 333. Stories generally did not feature minority or poor homeowners.   
 334. See supra Part II.C. 
 335. See supra Parts I.A.4, II.C. 
 336. See supra Part II.C. 
 337. See, e.g., Harwell, supra note 320.  
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of the members of the smartersafer.org coalition, questioned whether this 
actually was true,338 but to no avail.  Once the claim was made and 
supported with a few individual stories, it was repeated as if true. 
On the other side, in favor of moving towards market rates, were 
advocates trying to frame the issue as part of a different narrative.  
Taxpayers for Common Sense portrayed the NFIP as an example of 
government waste,339 and the R Street Institute highlighted the hypocrisy 
of fiscal conservatives who supported the subsidies but opposed other 
government giveaways.340  The smartersafer.org coalition included these 
groups as well as environmental groups such as the Sierra Club and 
National Wildlife Federation, insurance companies, and others bringing 
together environmental and fiscal concerns concerning overbuilding, 
sustainability, and deficits.341  The coalition called on Congress to follow 
through on the reforms and develop a targeted assistance plan for truly 
needy policyholders.342  But on this side there was no powerful human 
narrative and no heartrending image.  And the effect on the taxpayers 
who were paying for disaster relief as well as the NFIP subsidies and 
bailouts was very hard to convey and to see. 
Recall that Congress left intact the 2012 subsidy rollbacks for 
second homes, businesses, and severe repetitive loss properties.  The 
possible narratives that groups affected by removal of those subsidies 
could present were less viscerally and visually compelling.  Although 
efforts were made to argue that owners of second homes should not be 
subject to increased rates, these efforts did not gain traction.343  Even 
though some small businesses were gradually losing subsidies, the policy 
idea was probably that the cost of risk-based pricing, introduced in 
phases, would be gradually passed on to customers.  Severe repetitive 
loss properties, which by definition already had received extensive flood 
 
338.  R.J. Lehmann, Flood Insurance and the Phantom Real Estate Crash, R STREET 
(Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.rstreet.org/2014/01/31/flood-insurance-and-the-phantom-
real-estate-crash. 
 339. Ellis, supra note 321. 
 340. Eli Lehrer, The GOP’s Insurance Hypocrisy, HUFFPOST POL. (Nov. 1, 2013, 5:31 
PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/eli-lehrer/gop-insurance-hypocrisy_b_4194784.html. 
341.  See Coalition, SMARTERSAFER.ORG, http://www.smartersafer.org/coalition (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2014) (listing coalition partners).  
 342. Congress Must Implement Flood Insurance Reforms as Planned, 
SMARTERSAFER.ORG (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.smartersafer.org/flood-
reform/smartersafer-org-congress-must-implement-flood-insurance-reforms-as-planned.  
 343. See, e.g., Sue Belka, FEMA Unfair to Owners of Second Homes, PRESS 
ATLANTIC CITY (Apr. 2014), http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/opinion/letters/fema-
unfair-to-owners-of-second-homes/article_b5eb95b6-9ab2-53f0-b711-
b57c8c949fed.html?mode=jqm.   
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insurance benefits, made an even less compelling case for continuing 
subsidies.344 
c.  Common Human Response to Floods and Climate Change as 
 Predicted by Behavioral Economics 
Part of the shocked, outraged, and ultimately organized response to 
the rate increases may be due to the perception that the risk of floods and 
increased damage from climate change are so remote that it does not 
make sense to spend much money preparing for them.345  Unfortunately, 
people tend to inadequately prepare for low-probability, high-loss events 
because they often underestimate the magnitude of these events.346  The 
ostensible remoteness of the future events makes it seem like an outrage 
that people would have to pay significant amounts for the risk of living 
in a particular area.  This may be exacerbated when people expect 
disaster relief347 and is true even when people accept the reality of 
climate change.348 
The challenge of making flood risk salient at times other than right 
after floods is significant349 and is captured in an exchange between 
Senator Elizabeth Warren and Craig Fugate, Administrator of FEMA, in 
a hearing in fall 2013.  Senator Warren uses the example of a constituent 
living near a creek “which has never flooded” in anyone’s memory, 
whose house is now in a flood zone thanks to new maps, and who wants 
to appeal that determination.350  Administrator Fugate tries to make the 
point that the fact that the creek “has never flooded” is not very 
significant because what FEMA is looking at is risk of flood, over 100 
years.  But Senator Warren seems unconvinced. 
 
 344. See supra Part III.A.1.a. 
 345. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 346. Scales, supra note 3, at 9–10.  
 347. See supra Parts I.B.8, II.E. 
 348. Sen. Robert Menendez recognizes climate change and seems not to recognize the 
contradiction between the higher risks accompanying climate change and affordable 
flood insurance:  
From my own personal view, I think climate change is an important thing . . . .  
But for this coalition [to roll back the 2012 reforms] we have one singular 
focus.  And that focus is making sure that middle class families do not get 
priced out of what they have spent a lifetime to achieve, which is their home.  
Evan Lehmann, In Flood Insurance Fight, Some Climate Change Activists Battle Against 
Quicker Adaptation, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (Oct. 30, 2013), 
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059989658 (quoting Sen. Robert Menendez).  
 349. See supra Part II.B.2.  
 350. Hearing on FEMA Flood Maps, YOUTUBE (Sept. 19, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-3FfpCtHZQ8.  
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d.  FEMA’s Difficult Situation, Weak Communication, and  
 Response 
FEMA’s challenges also contributed to BW-12’s demise.  As 
mentioned earlier, Congress had called for FEMA to contract with the 
National Academy of Sciences for a study related to a targeted approach 
to affordability issues, and the study was not finished by the deadline 
Congress specified.351  Examination of the affordability study provision 
shows that Congress did not make the rate increases contingent on the 
study being done.  Moreover, given the wide breadth of the study, it 
seems completely unrealistic to think that it ever could have been 
completed in 270 days.  Nonetheless, its incompleteness was vocally 
used by Senator Schumer and others to halt the gradual elimination of 
some subsidies.352 
In 2013, as FEMA released flood maps and proposed rates, and the 
public outcry from a few policyholders ensued, FEMA did not say much 
in response.  When policyholders told the press about high new rates, 
FEMA could have responded more forcefully with information about the 
properties, showing their higher risk and that the rate increases were 
capped by the law at 25 percent per year, but FEMA seemingly did 
not.353  Some in Congress blamed FEMA for implementing the law 
Congress passed.354 
 
351. See supra Parts III.A.1.b, III.B.1.c. 
352. Long Island News & PRs, Schumer Announces Vote on Bipartisan Bill That 
Would Delay Excessive Flood Insurance Rate Increases for Thousands of New Yorkers, 
LONGISLAND.COM (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.longisland.com/news/01-07-14/schumer-
announces-vote-on-bipartisan-bill-that-would-delay-excessive-flood-insurance-rate-
increases.html (quoting Sen. Schumer) (“Residents are still recovering from the 
destructive force of Superstorm Sandy, and they should not be forced to pay unaffordable 
premiums as they attempt to rebuild, especially because FEMA has not come close to 
completing the required affordability study.”); Bipartisan Deal Reached to Delay Flood 
Insurance Premium Hikes: Waters, INS. J., (Oct. 28, 2013), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2013/10/28/309383.htm; Brad Plumer, 
Congress Tried to Cut Subsidies for Homes in Flood Zones.  It Was Harder than They 
Thought, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/30/congress-tried-to-stop-
subsidizing-homes-in-flood-zones-it-was-harder-than-they-thought/. 
 353. See, e.g., Mauriello, supra note 322 (quoting a business-owner whose premiums 
allegedly would go up tenfold).  FEMA’s fact sheet and the law itself said that rate 
increases were limited to 24% per year.  See Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act 
of 2012: Impact of National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) Changes, FEMA.GOV 
(Apr. 2013), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1909-25045-
0554/bw12_sec_205_207_factsheet4_13_2013.pdf.  
 354. Senate Takes First Step on Flood Insurance, Agent Licensing Bill, INS. J. (Jan. 
27, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/01/27/318549.htm 
(quoting Rep. Maxine Waters blaming FEMA for rate increases).  
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FEMA was in a difficult position because rates needed to go up 
before maps were completed.  The fact that the maps were not completed 
in itself should not have been too significant since it had long been 
known that subsidized rates were less than half of the risk-based rates.355  
The 2012 reforms required that rates in high-risk zones on subsidized old 
homes increase 25 percent per year.356  So it made sense for FEMA to 
start increasing rates and work on maps at the same time.  FEMA did not 
have specific data to show Congress how many (or how few) people 
were affected by map changes, and Administrator Fugate testified the 
number was “thousands.”357  But, given the weakness of the mapping 
program (thanks to Congress’s underfunding), the maps were suspect, 
which gave fuel to opponents to argue against the rate increases. 
e.  Summary of Reforms and Retreat 
This section has considered how the 2012 reforms happened and 
how the partial about-face by Congress occurred in 2014.  The 2012 
reforms were in tune with the market approach to government that has 
gained prominence in recent years, responded to extensive criticism of 
the NFIP, and were passed without negatively affected constituencies 
organizing vocal opposition.  When the reforms started to be 
implemented, several factors came together to undermine their staying 
power.  The combination of Superstorm Sandy and new flood maps in 
the New Jersey and New York area added to the seeming affront of the 
rate increases and spurred organized opposition in the Northeast, Gulf 
Coast, and elsewhere.  The intense lobbying and pressure by people 
affected by the removal of the subsidies, which was not on the merits but 
rather on the cost of the insurance, was powerful.  The real estate lobby 
played an influential role, arguing that rate increases threatened to scuttle 
the economic recovery.  Local and state governments also were 
concerned.  The large but diffuse group negatively affected by retaining 
the subsidies did not speak as loudly to their elected representatives.  
General interest-group theory would anticipate this result.  The narrative 
of the middle-class homeowner facing exorbitant rates was vivid, and 
claims of negative effects on the real estate market were accepted at face 
value.  The common human response of underestimating the magnitude 
of flood and climate change risks contributed to the outrage at increased 
rates.  Finally, the difficult position of FEMA, the failure to complete the 
“affordability study,” and its weak communication also helped make the 
 
 355. GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 31–32.   
 356. FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7. 
 357. Hearing on FEMA Flood Maps, supra note 350 (quoting Administrator Fugate).  
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subsidy rollbacks vulnerable.  The merits of continuing or discontinuing 
the subsidies were rarely mentioned directly in the debates. 
IV.   ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONGRESS IN 2017 
Congress’s about-face between 2012 and 2014 shows how dynamic 
flood insurance policy can be.  The factors that led to the repeal of the 
2014 reforms—lobbying by affected industries and individuals, powerful 
individual narratives with superficial media attention, avoidance of 
thinking about risks like floods and climate change, and weak 
communication from FEMA—all will likely continue in the future and 
may result in Congress kicking the can down the road even beyond 2017.  
However, this does not have to be the result.  There is now an 
opportunity for widespread education about the risks and costs of climate 
change and floods.  The public has the opportunity to consider whether 
and how to take a solidaristic approach to flood risk and federal flood 
insurance.  Congress, the media, and the public now have time to 
consider and reframe the issues in a deeper way than a panicked response 
to rate increases.  This section builds on the prior analysis and offers 
recommendations for Congress to consider.  Four main recommendations 
result from this analysis.  First, mapping must be protected from political 
influence.  Second, subsidies should gradually be phased out.  Third, a 
targeted affordability plan should be passed.  Fourth, a comprehensive 
strategy should be developed to deal with the long-term effects of floods 
and climate change.   
A.  Flood Risk Mapping:  Mapping Should Be Protected from Political 
Influence. 
The mapping process needs to be grounded in the most accurate 
scientific principles.  There really is no counterargument to this point, 
and if the maps are unassailable they will create a strong ground for rate 
reform.  Opponents of rate reform have always been able to point to the 
weakness of the mapping program as a way of attacking reform, but 
excellent maps will make this impossible.358 
 
 358. Even scientifically accurate maps may not help as much as hoped since many 
Americans have both a distrust of science and of government.  See generally Marshall, 
supra note 24, at 144–46 (noting American distrust of government); Emily Swanson, 
Americans Have Little Faith in Scientists, Science Journalists: Poll, HUFFPOST SCI. (Dec. 
21, 2013, 11:23 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/21/faith-in-
scientists_n_4481487.html; Gordon Gauchat, Politicization of Science in the Public 
Sphere: A Study of Public Trust in the United States, 1974 to 2010, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 167 
(2012). 
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By 2017, the remapping hopefully will have concluded.  For maps 
to be adopted as final, the community must approve them.359  Map 
creation, according to the 2012 reforms, is supposed to be nonpolitical 
and based only on scientific principles.360  Congress will receive a report 
from FEMA about how the process will work, according to the 2014 
reforms.361  The mapping process must be above politics and political 
pressure; sadly, recent press reports and an FBI investigation of 
remapping suggest that the mapping process may be subject to pressure 
and manipulation by wealthy landowners.362  For people to have faith in 
maps, rates, and the process, scientific objectivity is essential. 
The 2014 reforms create risks of continuing the politicization of the 
mapping process in at least two ways.  First, they require the FEMA 
Administrator to consider “the impact flood insurance rate map updates 
have on the affordability of flood insurance” in his report to Congress on 
the “Affordability Framework.”363  This may put pressure on the 
Administrator to forego map updates that show higher flood risk in 
politically powerful areas.  Second, the required appointment of a “Flood 
Insurance Advocate” whose job includes arguing for “the fair treatment 
of policy holders . . . in the mapping of flood hazards”364 may put 
additional political pressure on the mapping.  This notion of “fair 
treatment . . . in the mapping of flood hazards” has the potential for 
politicizing the mapping process, since it may seem to many 
homeowners who find their homes at high flood risk that analyses based 
on scientific risk are not “fair.”365  But hopefully the Advocate will take 
the position that maps based on valid scientific principles are “fair” even 
 
 359. Brochure, FEMA, Adoption of Flood Insurance Rate Maps by Participating 
Communities 5 (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/20130726-1903-25045-4716/fema_495.pdf. 
 360. See Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12), Pub. L. No. 
112-141, §§ 100215–100218, 126 Stat. 405, 924–32 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4101a, 
4101b, 4104, 4104–1 (2012)); supra Part III.A.1.c.    
 361. The 2014 reforms require specific communication to Congress that the program 
will result in “technically credible flood hazard data.”  Homeowner Flood Insurance 
Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 17, 128 Stat. 1020, 1027 (to be codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 4101d). 
 362.   Richard Rainey, FBI Investigating FEMA for Coastal Flood Map Boundary 
Changes, NBC Reports, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE  (April 2, 2014), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/04/fbi_investigating_fema 
for_coa.hmtl.  
 363.  See supra Part III.C.2. 
 364.  § 24(a), 128 Stat. at 1030 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4033(a)). 
 365.  This brings up the classic debate over what “fairness” means and should mean 
in insurance:  is it actuarial fairness or some other concept of fairness?  See generally 
BAKER, supra note 5, at ch. 1; ABRAHAM, supra note 5; Leah Wortham, The Economics of 
Insurance Classification: The Sound of One Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 83 
(1986); Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517 
(1983). 
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if they show increased flood risk to homeowners.  Also, the Advocate 
may be able to foster better communication between FEMA and the 
public.  FEMA has strong new incentives to make sure maps are accurate 
because the 2014 reforms let homeowners receive costs of successful 
appeals.366 
In the 2012 and 2014 reforms, Congress created the tools to make it 
possible for the mapping process to be based on scientific principles, 
unswayed by political pressure.367  Some Congressmen and women have 
had a tendency to blame FEMA when their constituents complain about 
flood insurance.368  If reform is to be successful, Congress instead needs 
to stand behind FEMA when it makes rate changes based on scientific 
risk determinations. 
B.  Subsidies:  The Remaining General Subsidies Should Gradually Be 
Phased Out. 
In 2014, Congress restored some, though not all, of the general 
subsidies.  Specifically, as noted above, it restored the “old house” 
subsidies and the grandfathering subsidies.369  It repealed the sale trigger 
provision so that if a house with a subsidized policy was sold, the 
subsidized rate would continue, whereas the 2012 reforms had said that 
subsidies would end when homes were sold.370  But the 2014 law did 
continue the gradual elimination of subsidies for second homes, severe 
repetitive loss properties, and businesses.371  It also added a surcharge on 
all policies to make up for the cost of the continued subsidies.372 
When Congress revisits the NFIP in 2017, 49 years after starting it, 
Congress should pass legislation that gradually eliminates the subsidies.  
After five decades, it is appropriate to ask when subsidies will end and to 
ask for an explanation from those who want to continue them. 
Subsidies should gradually end for at least three reasons.  First, they 
create illogical incentives, particularly given climate change.  Second, 
the justification for subsidies and the solidaristic approach to flood 
insurance they reflect is weaker than in other contexts where the federal 
government has been involved in insurance.  Third, risk-based rates will 
 
 366.   § 18, 128 Stat. at 1027 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4017(a), 4104(f)).  
 367.   There is no necessary reason why the mapping must be done by FEMA; this 
function could perhaps be contracted out at some point and with new technology might 
become increasingly easy and inexpensive.  See generally Owen, supra note 30.   
 368.   Verchick & Johnson, supra note 274; Senate Takes First Step on Flood 
Insurance, Agent Licensing Bill, supra note 354 (quoting Rep. Maxine Waters blaming 
FEMA for rate increases).   
 369.   § 4, 128 Stat. at 1022 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4015).  
 370.  § 3(b), 128 Stat. at 1021–22 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014).  
 371.   See supra Part III.B.1.b.iii. 
 372.   § 8, 128 Stat. at 1023–24 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4015a, 4017a).  
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likely bring private competition and state insurance regulation, which 
will likely be overall more efficient and better for consumers than the 
current system.  As discussed in the next section, particularly given that 
flood insurance is mandatory for mortgage-holders in flood zones, there 
should be an “affordability” plan, but it should be targeted to the needy. 
1.  The Incentives Created by the Current Subsidies Make No  
 Sense, Particularly Given Climate Change Risks.  
Sea levels are rising and extreme weather events including flooding 
are becoming more common.  The risks of living on the coasts and by 
certain rivers are increasing.  There should be a compelling reason for 
the government to incentivize citizens to live in flood zones, particularly 
in older homes, but it has not been offered.  A person owning an older 
house that needs renovation or replacement benefits from not doing 
extensive renovations on the house that might make it more flood-
resistant and is penalized for doing extensive renovations of a house.373  
The NFIP encourages retention of and indeed inflates the value of older 
homes near the water.374  It encourages building in flood-prone areas, yet 
the federal government has no way to enforce restrictions on 
development in floodplains.375  These policies make little sense right now 
given the risks we face. 
On the other side of the issue, there is a massive denial of climate 
change and resistance to planning for it.376  This Article accepts the 
science supporting climate change and does not consider denial to be a 
valid counterargument.  However, even many who accept the science of 
climate change nonetheless support the subsidies.377  Supporters of the 
subsidies, even if they do not say so openly, tend to hold that the 
discounted insurance is positive and should be continued because it is 
important to real estate market stability and homeowners who have relied 
on the subsidies for decades.  Federal disaster aid, including rebuilding 
aid, is essential and simply part of what governments should do.378  
Increased costs of insurance are negative because they tamp down and 
 
 373.   See supra Part II.C.   
 374.   See supra Part II.C.    
 375.   See supra Part II.A, C; Kildow & Scorse, supra note 22. 
 376.   See, e.g., Engaging Diverse Audiences with Climate Change, supra note 191 
(manuscript at 16–27).  
 377.   See supra note 348 (discussing the statement of Sen. Menendez).  
 378.   Federal disaster aid in some cases has been used to rebuild roads and properties 
repeatedly.  See, e.g., Justin Gillis & Felicity Barringer, As Coasts Rebuild and U.S. Pays, 
Repeatedly, the Critics Ask Why, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/science/earth/as-coasts-rebuild-and-us-pays-again-
critics-stop-to-ask-why.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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threaten to destroy the real estate market.379  Reflecting its dependence 
on government subsidies in some regions, the real estate industry 
vociferously opposed the rate increases called for by the 2012 reforms.380  
The reasons that the real estate industry in flood-prone areas should be 
particularly supported in this way have not been explained.  The 
subsidies and government rebuilding allow homeowners and the real 
estate industry to not bear the costs of the risks they face.  Instead, 
taxpayers ultimately share those costs, which are bound to go up.  
Precisely why the real estate industry and homeowners in these areas 
should receive this largesse indefinitely has not been made clear. 
2.   The Justification for Subsidies and the Current Solidaristic  
 Approach to Flood Insurance is Weaker Than in Other  
 Contexts Where the Federal Government Has Been Involved  
 in Insurance. 
A second reason why the general subsidies should be phased out is 
that the argument for the federal government to continue with the 
solidaristic approach, justifying these subsidies, is weaker than in other 
contexts where the federal government takes a solidaristic approach to 
insurance.  Three examples of federal involvement with insurance in 
urban areas, reinsurance for riots and crime, unemployment insurance, 
and health insurance, are contexts where the federal government has 
been involved in insurance that contrast with the federal government’s 
involvement with flood insurance. 
a.  Federal Reinsurance for Riots:  Fair Access to Insurance  
 Requirements Plans 
At the same time that Congress passed the Flood Act to deal with a 
void in the private insurance market for floods, it passed a law to deal 
with a void in the private insurance market in urban areas.  This was the 
Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968 (“UPPRA”).381  
Both before and after the urban riots in 1966, inner cities faced a crisis in 
 
 379.   See, e.g., Jeff Harrington, Premiums Rising for National Flood Program, 
Though Florida Pales in Payouts, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 15, 2013, 4:30 AM), 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/banking/premiums-rising-for-national-flood-
program-though-florida-pales-in-payouts/2126888; Mauriello, supra note 322; Harwell, 
supra note 320. 
 380.   Opinion, Flooding Capitol Hill: Republicans Cave to the Realtors on Taxpayer 
Flood Insurance, supra note 320. 
 381.   Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 
82 Stat. 555 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1749bbb to 1749bbb-21 (1976)), amended by 
Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-557, 92 
Stat. 2080.   
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the lack of affordable insurance for homes.382  Congress responded by 
passing the UPPRA, which authorized states to pass Fair Access to 
Insurance Requirements (“FAIR”) plans and provided federal riot 
reinsurance to companies who participated in these plans.383  These FAIR 
plans primarily were aimed at making affordable property insurance 
more readily available in urban areas.384  FAIR plans varied by state but 
had to meet basic federal requirements in order for participating 
companies to receive federal reinsurance for riots.  In 1970, the law was 
amended to authorize the Secretary of the HUD to offer federal insurance 
against burglary and theft.385  The arrangements were not perfect, of 
course, but worked reasonably well.386  Eventually, private reinsurers 
returned to the market, and Congress terminated the riot reinsurance 
program in 1985.387  Riots are now covered under standard homeowner 
policies.388 
The federal reinsurance for riots and federal crime insurance were 
invented to deal with a national emergency, widespread urban decline 
that threatened the survival of U.S. cities.389  Incentivizing insurance 
companies to offer insurance in cities was an action called for by the 
National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas.390  The 
case for federal involvement was strong.  Insurance companies had been 
redlining whole areas, refusing to insure them and contributing 
significantly to their decline.391  The cities and states did not have the 
 
 382.   Joanne Dwyer, Fair Plans: History, Holtzman and the Arson-for-Profit Hazard, 
7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 617, 623, 626 (1978); PRESIDENT’S NAT’L ADVISORY PANEL ON INS. 
IN RIOT-AFFECTED AREAS, 94TH CONG., MEETING THE INSURANCE CRISIS OF OUR CITIES 
32 (1968) [hereinafter ADVISORY PANEL ON INS. REPORT]; Alan S. Kaplinsky, Insurance 
in Urban Areas: An Analysis of Recent Statutory Solutions, 10 B.C. L. REV. 650, 650–653  
(1969).   
 383.   Dwyer, supra note 382, at 626.    
 384.   § 1103, 82 Stat. at 558 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb–3(b) (1994)).  
 385.   Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-609, § 602(b), 
(d), 84 Stat. 1770, 1788–89 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-2(a)(2), -10a(b) (1994)).  
 386.   Dwyer, supra note 382, at 632–37.  
 387.   12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb(b) (1994); BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R42716, TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE: ISSUE ANALYSIS AND OVERVIEW OF CURRENT 
PROGRAM 11 (2014).  
 388.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-179, HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE: 
MULTIPLE CHALLENGES MAKE EXPANDING PRIVATE COVERAGE DIFFICULT 9 (2014).  
 389.   See Dwyer, supra note 382, at 617–23, 626.   
 390.   Dwyer, supra note 382, at 617; ADVISORY PANEL ON INS. REPORT, supra note 
382, at 32.  The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders set up the distinct 
National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas, which later endorsed the 
report of the Advisory Panel on Insurance.  OTTO KERNER ET AL., REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 15 (1968); Dwyer, supra note 
382, at 617.  
 391.   Dwyer, supra note 382 at 618–21; ADVISORY PANEL ON INS. REPORT, supra 
note 382, at 10.    
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resources to stabilize the situation.  The federal government’s 
involvement was targeted and limited both in scope and in time.  The 
federal government did not take over the underwriting risk.  Instead, it 
created incentives for states to prod insurance companies to shoulder 
some of the risk because of the importance of the coverage.  It also 
provided a reward in the form of federal reinsurance for companies 
which took some of the risk. 
b.  Federal Unemployment Insurance 
Federal legislation passed in 1935 encouraged states to adopt their 
own unemployment insurance laws, and all states have done so.392  This 
was one of the measures taken by Congress to try to counteract the 
effects of the Great Depression.393  It aimed to fill a void in the private 
market; there was no private unemployment insurance available on the 
market, apparently because of concern about moral hazard and the 
challenge of distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary 
unemployment.394  The structure was that there would be a payroll tax on 
the vast majority of employees and that those who participated in a 
satisfactory state unemployment insurance program could deduct the full 
amount of their state contributions from the federal tax.395  The goals 
were to help stabilize the economy and lessen individual hardship from 
job loss that was not the individual’s fault.396  While largely financed 
through a payroll tax on employers, when economic downturns continue, 
the federal government has supplemented payments, at times in the 
billions of dollars.397  Debates continue to focus on costs and benefits, 
whether its financing structure makes sense,398 and moral hazard.399  
 
 392.   MOSS, supra note 16, at 197–98; Unemployment Insurance 75th Anniversary, 
DEP’T LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ocia/pdf/75th-Anniversary-Summary-FINAL.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Fact Sheet, Unemployment Insurance].  
 393.   It was part of the Social Security Act.  MOSS, supra note 16, at 180, 197.  
 394.   MOSS, supra note 16, at 188–91. 
 395.   Id. at 193–94 (discussing the adopted tax-offset scheme).  
 396.  Unemployment Insurance, Fact Sheet, supra note 392.   
 397.   Wesley Lowery, Advocates Renew Efforts to Urge Congress to Extend 
Unemployment Benefits, WASH. POST (June 10, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/advocates-renew-efforts-to-urge-congress-to-
extend-unemployment-benefits/2014/06/10/2224da50-eff0-11e3-914c-
1fbd0614e2d4_story.html.  
 398.   See Brian D. Galle, Myopia, Fiscal Federalism, and Unemployment Insurance: 
Time to Reform UI Financing 1, 2–3 (Boston Coll. Law Sch. Legal Studies, Research 
Paper No. 265, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2031728; Wayne Vroman, Financing 
Unemployment Insurance After the Great Recession, UNEMPLOYMENT & RECOVERY 
PROJECT (Urban Inst., D.C.), Aug. 2012, at 1, 2, available at 
http://www.urban.org/publications/412639.html; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
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States can and do vary their laws, and the laws have very wide coverage.  
But the need for stabilizing the economy was (and at times, is) 
compelling, and federal unemployment insurance plays this role.400  
States, cities, employers, and the private insurance market do not have 
the wherewithal to deal with economic consequences of unemployment, 
and the federal unemployment insurance program helps steady the 
economy.401  Further, it spreads a risk that is not in control of individuals 
and that almost everyone faces. 
c. Affordable Care Act 
The Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) was passed in 2010; at that time, 
40 million Americans did not have health insurance, many states had not 
been able to deal with the problems of uninsured Americans,402 and there 
was a consensus across the political spectrum that reform was needed so 
that more Americans would have health insurance.403  While the 
Affordable Care Act is a behemoth reflecting myriad policies, it contains 
a web of complex subsidies, linked with mandates, in service of the idea 
that health care is important to everyone in our society and that risk 
sharing through insurance is a way to pay for it.404  Although concerns 
are raised about costs, bureaucracy, and other aspects,405 it is a context 
where government getting involved in insurance markets makes sense.  
The risk of illness is universally shared although not evenly distributed; 
 
GAO-10-440, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS: LONG-STANDING STATE 
FINANCING POLICIES HAVE INCREASED RISK OF INSOLVENCY (2010).  
 399.   See, e.g., Arthur Delaney, Conservatives Credit End of Benefits for Declining 
Unemployment Rate, HUFFPOST POL. (Jul. 7, 2014, 4:17 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/07unemployment-extension_n_5564019.html. 
 400.   Galle, supra note 398, at 2–3. 
 401.   Id. 
 402.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2612 (2012) (Ginsburg, 
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); Brief of 
Health Care for All, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners Urging Reversal on 
the Minimum Coverage Provision Issue at 4, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 
S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 160242, at *4. 
 403.   Kenneth S. Abraham & Daniel Schwarz, Health Care Supplement to 
Abraham’s Insurance Law & Regulation 12 (5th ed. 2010)   
 404.   See generally Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility after the 
Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577 (2011). 
 405.   Recently in lawsuits that challenged the propriety of some of the law’s 
subsidies, one divided federal appeals court held the subsidies unauthorized by the 
statute, and another federal appeals court held the subsidies authorized by the law.  Abby 
Goodnough, Ruling on Health Care Subsidies Puts Coverage at Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 
23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/24/us/politics/court-ruling-on-health-care-
subsidies-risks-loss-of-coverage.html. 
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public health concerns support wide provision of health care to 
citizens.406 
These three contexts, insurance in urban areas, federal 
unemployment insurance, and the ACA, present more compelling 
reasons for federal government involvement in insurance than does flood 
insurance.  With urban reinsurance and FAIR plans, swaths of entire 
cities were at risk, and insurance company conduct wrote off large areas 
to the detriment of targeted populations and cities as a whole.  Helping 
insure those areas and properties made tremendous sense and did not 
create moral hazard concerns.  This differs radically from federal flood 
insurance where moral hazard is significant, as well as other problematic 
incentives created by the NFIP.  Federal involvement in urban property 
insurance, also unlike flood insurance, was limited and temporary.  
Federal unemployment insurance is mostly paid for by employers’ 
payroll tax deductions; it is only when the economy truly nosedives that 
the federal government gets involved.  This, too, differs from federal 
flood insurance where the federal government underwrites the entire risk.  
Finally, under the ACA, securing health care and health insurance to all 
citizens through market intervention makes sense from a policy and 
humanitarian perspective.  Flood insurance subsidies as presently 
structured do not have these benefits, and they have negative 
consequences as outlined above. 
3.   Accurate Maps and Risk-Based Rates May Bring More Private  
 Competition and State Insurance Regulation Which Overall  
 Will Be Positive. 
The general subsidies should gradually be phased out because they 
hamper the private market’s ability to provide basic homeowners flood 
coverage.407  Once the maps are completed and Congress definitively sets 
a timetable for the subsidies to be gradually eliminated, private insurance 
will likely expand in the market for basic homeowners coverage.  
Lloyd’s offers some basic private flood insurance in Florida; other 
insurers are offering similar coverage.408  Congress should continue to 
 
 406.   The Affordable Care Act is solidaristic with some actuarial elements, such as 
allowing specific price differentials for individual policies by four factors: family status, 
geographic region, age, and tobacco use.  45 C.F.R. § 147.102(a)(1)(i)–(iv) (2013). 
 407.  GAO, 2014 PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT REPORT, supra note 4, at 25; GAO, 
2007 NATURAL CATASTROPHE INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 189, at 5–6.  
 408. See Jeff Harrington, Battling Flood Insurance Rate Hikes Without Government 
Help, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 12, 2014, 12:49 PM), 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/banking/battling-flood-insurance-rate-hikes-
without-government-help/2160697 (reporting that Lloyd’s of London is now offering 
flood insurance in Florida); Jay MacDonald, Lower-Cost Flood Options Flow In, 
BANKRATE (Apr. 25, 2014, 6:00 AM), 
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encourage private sector involvement and offer policies with variety, 
such as the high-deductible option mentioned in the 2014 reforms.409  
Private insurers are better at some aspects of risk reduction than federal 
or state governments.410  If rates are based on risk, better risk-modeling 
information will become available, resulting in healthy competition 
between insurers.411  Private companies’ data collection about risk, their 
nuanced rate-making, and the individual attention that can be provided 
by producers all mean that they may be able to offer more variety in 
products and better rates than the standard federal flood policy.412  
Further, while insurance remains regulated by the states, consumer-
friendly insurance-law doctrines will apply to private flood insurance.413  
Although flood risk is a difficult risk to insure, there is flood insurance 
available for some properties above the federal limits as well as 
commercial insurance.414  Making it easier for the private market to 
expand will not be a panacea, and the federal government might still 
need to play a role, for example, in providing reinsurance, but it would 
be an improvement over the current system.415 
C.  Affordability:  Congress Should Pass an “Affordability” Plan, But 
It Should Be Limited and Targeted Towards the Needy. 
Flood insurance is both mandated and subsidized in certain 
geographical areas:  federal law mandates it for mortgage holders in 
 
http://www.bankrate.com/financing/insurance/lloyds-offers-viable-flood-option/; Private 
Market Could Grow as Government Flood Insurance Prices Rise: Fitch, INS. J. (Mar. 6, 
2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/03/06/322380.htm; Leslie 
Scism, Private Insurers Start to Offer Flood Coverage, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2014, 3:38 
PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304834704579405082969457564. 
 409.  Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 
12, 128 Stat. 1020, 1025 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4013(d)) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 
4013 to provide that the Administrator shall make available policies with deductibles of 
up to and including $10,000).  
 410.  See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How 
Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 224 n.85 and accompanying 
text (2012) (providing example of private insurers using hurricane shutters to reduce 
insurance premiums).  As noted earlier, the federal government does not control local or 
state land use and decisions on the local level are often politicized.  See supra Part I.A.4. 
 411.  GAO, 2014 PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT REPORT, supra note 4, at 11–12. 
 412.  See generally id.; GAO, 2007 NATURAL CATASTROPHE INSURANCE REPORT, 
supra note 189.  
 413. See Scales, supra note 3, at 24–25, 33–34. 
 414.  Private Market Could Grow as Government Flood Insurance Prices Rise: Fitch, 
supra note 408 (reporting that private market for flood insurance consists largely of 
commercial flood insurance and insurance over the federal limits). 
 415. See generally GAO, 2014 PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT REPORT, supra note 4, 
at 1.  
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flood zones and provides subsidies for many homes in those zones.416  
There are good reasons for the mandate417 but weak reasons for the 
general subsidies.418  For low-income residents of high-risk areas who 
have mortgages and are thus subject to the mandate, however, the 
gradual subsidy elimination would be “overly burdensome.”419  This 
creates a need for some sort of an affordability plan. 
The 2012 reforms called for a study to be done by the National 
Academy of Sciences to analyze methods of establishing an affordability 
framework “through targeted assistance rather than generally subsidized 
rates, including means-tested vouchers.”420  The 2014 reforms expanded 
the provisions about affordability, requiring the FEMA administrator to 
prepare a draft framework to address “the issues of affordability of flood 
insurance sold under the [NFIP], including issues identified in the 
affordability study.”421  The FEMA administrator, in developing his 
affordability plan, is required to consider several criteria, including 
“targeted assistance to flood policyholders based on their financial ability 
to continue to participate in the [NFIP]” and “the impact flood insurance 
rate map updates have on the affordability of flood insurance.”422  The 
2014 reforms increased the amount of money allotted for the study to 
$2.5 million from $750,000 and required the study be submitted within 
18 months.423  The 2014 law’s provisions about the affordability study 
are complex and unlikely to result in a clear answer as to what Congress 
should do about affordability.424  It is a mistake, then, to wait for the 
“affordability” study without independently considering what should be 
done. 
What are the arguments for an affordability plan for flood 
insurance, since normally the owner can sell if the costs of owning an 
asset become too high?  There are three arguments, as expert Carolyn 
Kousky explains, in discussing state natural catastrophe insurance 
programs.425  One is a political response to subsidize “vocal, high-risk 
 
 416.  See supra Parts I.A.4, I.B.2, I.B.4.   
 417.  See supra Parts I.B.4, III.A.1.d (explaining that the mandate was passed because 
without it demand was too low for program to be viable).  
 418.  See supra Part IV.B.   
 419.  GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 36. 
 420.  Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12), Pub. L. 112-
141, § 100236(a)(3), 126 Stat. 405, 957. 
 421.  Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 
9(a), 128 Stat. 1020, 1024; see supra Part III.B.1.c. 
 422.  § 9(b)(2), (5), 128 Stat. at 1024.  
 423.  See supra note 283 (providing specifics about the study). 
 424.  See supra Part III.B.1.c; supra note 283. 
 425.  Carolyn Kousky, Managing the Risk of Natural Catastrophes: The Role and 
Functioning of State Insurance Programs 14 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 
RFF DP 10-30, 2010), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-10-30.pdf. 
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residents.”426  This is essentially what Congress did with the majority of 
subsidies in 2014.  Yet, there is hope for a more reflective response in the 
future.  The second argument, Kousky explains, is “an equity argument: 
some low-income homeowners reside in high-hazard areas, and it is a 
government role to help these homeowners afford insurance, just as 
society subsidizes their food and health care.”427  The third is an 
economic argument: 
[I]nsurance . . . is necessary for development, and some types of 
development must be in high-risk areas but provide economic 
spillovers that justify insurance subsidies.  The extent to which this is 
the case is a difficult empirical question that to my knowledge has not 
been thoroughly addressed but would likely justify only very small 
and targeted subsidies in any event.428 
What we have, of course, are not small and targeted subsidies but 
large and general subsidies.  The only strong argument for subsidies, 
then, is the equity argument that would extend subsidies to poor people 
as part of government’s role in subsidizing food, health care, and 
housing.  The existing general federal flood insurance subsidies for older 
homes and grandfathered homes in flood-prone areas were not targeted at 
people with low incomes or limited assets.  The subsidies covered some 
people with low incomes and limited assets.  However, these subsidies 
also covered homeowners who were not poor or middle class.429  
Wealthy people with older oceanfront homes have received massive 
subsidies for almost 50 years; if the home is their primary residence, they 
will still receive the subsidies.  Homeowners’ property insurance rates 
generally vary by degree of risk, including building materials and 
exposure to catastrophes; by contrast, flood risk, for no good reason, 
enjoys a most favored risk status.430  The GAO, informed organizations, 
and academic experts have suggested a way out of the current 
unacceptable situation.  Those organizations and experts argue that 
Congress should gradually eliminate subsidized rates and charge full 
rates to everyone but also fund a means-tested subsidy for some 
policyholders.431  The most detailed plan was developed by Professor 
 
 426.  Id. 
 427.  Id. 
 428.  Id. at 14–15.    
 429.  See supra Part III.A.1.b, III.B.1.c; see also supra text accompanying notes 231–
43. 
 430.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-179, HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE: 
MULTIPLE CHALLENGES MAKE EXPANDING PRIVATE COVERAGE DIFFICULT 5 (2014).  
 431.  See, e.g., GAO, 2014 PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT REPORT, supra note 4, at 
18 ; GAO, 2011ACTION NEEDED REPORT, supra note 68, at 60 (2011) (suggesting general 
subsidies be eliminated but Congress provide assistance to needy homeowners to help 
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Howard Kunreuther and his colleagues.  They propose a means-tested 
program coupled with loans for mitigation renovations that would be a 
large improvement over the status quo.432 
One question that Congress should consider if it decides to institute 
a means-tested plan is what agency will administer the plan and 
determine who is eligible?  After all, FEMA’s programs are not means-
tested.  The Department of Homeland Security, of which FEMA is a part, 
does not administer means-tested programs. Thus, the question arises as 
to whether FEMA or another agency would administer the means test.433  
The plan by Kunreuther and his colleagues calls for a system where 
mitigation is encouraged by low-cost loans for mitigation coupled with 
lower insurance rates.434  This would require on-the-ground involvement 
by the NFIP, on a property-by-property level all over the country, which 
would be very expensive at first, but ultimately would improve the 
program and reduce overall costs.435 
Another issue involves setting an appropriate cut-off level.  How 
limited are the means that would entitle a person to a voucher or benefit 
from the plan?436  Providing means-tested insurance to a limited number 
 
pay the premiums); Ass’n of State Floodplain Managers, Inc., Flood Insurance 
Affordability: ASFPM Recommendations to Address the Impact of NFIP Reform 2012 
(BW-12), FLOODS.ORG 2 (April 26, 2013), http://www.floods.org/ace-
files/documentlibrary/2012_NFIP_Reform/ASFPM_recommendations_on_BW-
12_affordability_26April2013.pdf (calling for means-tested program); KUNREUTHER & 
MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 333 (suggesting voucher program similar to food 
stamps); Kousky & Kunreuther, supra note 246, at 3 (proposing voucher program linked 
to mitigation measures); Andrew G. Simpson, Groups Urge Congress to Target Flood 
Insurance Fix to Help Needy, Not Wealthy, INS. J., (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/01/09/316502.htm. 
 432.  Kousky & Kunreuther, supra note 246, at 1; KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, 
supra note 3, at 333.  
 433.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-221, MEANS-TESTED 
PROGRAMS: INFORMATION ON PROGRAM ACCESS CAN BE AN IMPORTANT 
MANAGEMENT TOOL 6–8 (2005) (providing examples of means-tested programs and 
agencies that administer them, including Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, Head 
Start, Medicaid (administered by the Department of Health and Human Services), 
housing choice vouchers, public housing (administered by the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development), food stamps and the Women, Infants and Children Program 
(administered by the Agriculture Department), the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(administered by the Internal Revenue Service and the Education Department), and the 
Supplemental Security Income program (administered by the Social Security 
Administration)).  
 434.  Kousky & Kunreuther, supra note 246, at 3 (proposing voucher program linked 
to mitigation measures). 
 435.  Another question is what would be the means that would be tested?  Would 
income, assets, home value, or a combination of the three be used?  Income data are more 
readily available than asset data through tax returns.  Home value data are available from 
state real estate taxing authority; but home value data would not easily apply to renters.  
Asset data might be the most difficult to obtain.   
 436.  Kousky, supra note 425, at 14–15.   
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of policyholders would have benefits, but it could have drawbacks as 
well.  For example, if the plan provides below-cost insurance, it may lead 
to unwise development much as in the current system.437 
Examples from the federal flood program itself and from state plans 
offering property insurance for high-risk policyholders who have trouble 
finding insurance in the regular market all suggest the affordability plan 
should be small and limited.  Regarding the federal flood program itself, 
there has been very little private homeowners coverage for floods for at 
least 50 years.438  One of the reasons for this is that flood is a challenging 
risk to insure.  Moreover, the federally subsidized rates have made it 
difficult for private insurers to compete.439  Better information about risk, 
for example, through advanced computer modeling, will enable 
companies to price insurance in line with risk; but if existing subsidies 
continue, insurers may not bother to expand into the homeowners flood 
insurance market.440 
State-subsidized property insurance for high-risk policyholders can 
easily balloon beyond its original narrow goal.  Many states in the 1970s 
established plans incentivizing insurance companies to cover urban 
properties they were otherwise unwilling to insure.441  Since then, many 
of these plans have been shifted by legislation from insuring urban 
properties to insuring high-risk coastal areas.442  With these coastal 
insurance plans, rates are often subject to political manipulation and are 
not based on risk.443  This can lead to private insurers exiting the market, 
reduced choice for policyholders, unwise development in coastal areas, 
and costs shared among all taxpayers.444  None of the state FAIR plans, 
or other state natural disaster plans, are targeted toward low-income 
residents, so no plan presents an adequate model.445  This situation, 
where below-cost insurance offered by the state to fill a market void but 
expands, crowding out private insurers and resulting in the state 
 
 437.  Kousky, supra note 425, at 15.  
 438.  See supra Part I.  
 439.  See generally GAO, 2014 PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT REPORT, supra note 4, 
at 1.  
 440.  Id. at 10–12, 18. 
 441.  Dwyer, supra note 382, at 617; ROBERT P. HARTWIG & CLAIRE WILKINSON, INS. 
INFO. INST., RESIDUAL MARKET PROPERTY PLANS: FROM MARKETS OF LAST RESORT TO 
MARKETS OF FIRST CHOICE 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/ResidualMarketWhitePaper-20131.pdf; see supra 
Part IV.B.2.a (describing FAIR plans).   
 442.  HARTWIG & WILKINSON, supra note 441, at 21.  
 443.  Id. at 21, 23–24. 
 444.  Id. at 25–27. 
 445.  Kousky, supra note 425, at 14–15.   
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becoming the major insurer for that risk, is an example of what Congress 
should seek to avoid as it develops an affordability plan.446 
Many strong reasons call for gradually eliminating the existing 
subsidies, but for low-income policyholders, risk-based rates may be 
overly burdensome.  While Congress may be tempted to wait until the 
“affordability study” is done before it makes decisions about the 
subsidies, it should not wait because the study is likely to raise more 
questions than answers.  The only strong argument for an affordability 
plan is the equitable argument that part of government’s role is to assist 
low-income people, in flood insurance as in other arenas like food and 
health care.  Therefore a means-tested plan should accompany the 
elimination of subsidies, as the GAO and experts have said for years.  
This would be a partially solidaristic approach to flood insurance based 
on the justification of need, unlike the current approach which does not 
have such a grounding.447  Congress needs to craft the plan carefully so 
that it does not repeat the problems of the existing program (for example, 
if the cutoff is too high) and could use this opportunity to create a limited 
plan that would encourage mitigation and perhaps result in lower future 
losses. 
D.  Congress Should Pass a Framework to Deal with the Long-Term 
Effects of Climate Change. 
The original flood insurance law called for a comprehensive 
approach to floodplain management and national flood policy.448  That in 
itself is a very challenging goal even if there was political consensus to 
reach it.  Given many factors such as the multi-faceted structure of our 
government, geographical diversity, climate change denial, and changing 
risks, it seems likely to be an elusive goal.  However, Congress could at 
least strongly encourage dissemination of flood risk information so that 
flood risk becomes and remains more salient and so that more people are 
willing to buy insurance and take steps to reduce risk.  If the climate 
change risks unfold as predicted, comprehensive, coordinated, and 
 
 446.  Similar outcomes have resulted in the auto insurance context where residual 
market plans aimed at high-risk policyholders have offered such attractive rates that the 
residual market becomes the largest insurer in the state, resulting in devastating financial 
consequences.  See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. State, 590 A.2d 191, 196 (N.J. 
1991). 
 447.  O’NEILL & O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 6–7 (asserting that solidaristic approaches 
to government insurance are generally based on a broad justification such as need).  
 448.  National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1302(c), 82 Stat. 
572, 573 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4001(c) (2012)) (“The Congress further finds that . . . 
(2) the objectives of a flood insurance program should be integrally related to a unified 
national program for flood plain management . . . .”). 
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drastic measures will need to be taken.449  Floods are not the only 
relevant risk, but, if Congress can manage to develop a comprehensive 
yet nuanced plan to respond to floods,450 perhaps it could be a step 
towards facing other climate change challenges. 
CONCLUSION 
Floods and flood risk present huge dilemmas particularly in light of 
climate change, which is likely to bring more severe and frequent floods.  
The federal government has been the underwriter of homeowners’ basic 
flood insurance coverage since 1968.  Flood insurance is challenging for 
many reasons, including the arduousness of determining flood risks, the 
correlated nature of flood losses, the widespread tendency to discount the 
magnitude of risks like floods, and the federal government’s limited 
enforcement authority over state and local decisions that affect the risk.  
It has taken on the role of underwriting a risk that is very difficult to 
insure by offering a product that people have to be compelled to buy 
even when it is sold at half-price.  The NFIP currently owes the Treasury 
Department $24 billion.  This article has analyzed the NFIP as it 
developed from its start in 1968 to the 2012 and 2014 reforms.  Congress 
has always had inconsistent goals for the NFIP and has taken a range of 
approaches to flood insurance.  The program’s initial solidaristic 
approach, which featured general subsidies for the oldest and riskiest 
properties, has been widely criticized.  A spectrum of critics found fault 
with the NFIP’s finances, environmental impacts, mapping, and 
incentives, which encouraged building and discouraged replacement of 
flood-prone buildings in high-risk areas. 
 In 2012, Congress, by a wide bipartisan majority, reformed the 
NFIP, moving it towards an actuarial approach where all rates eventually 
would be based on flood risk, subsidies would be phased out, and maps 
would be revised based solely on science.  This would encourage private 
insurers to market basic homeowners flood insurance coverage and result 
in homeowners bearing the risk of their properties’ location.  The 2012 
reforms seemed modest at the time but were greeted by a huge 
counterreaction from outraged constituents and the real estate industry.  
 
 449.  See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 199, at 69; Verchick & Johnson, supra note 274 
(manuscript at 2).  
 450. Alliances between insurance groups and environmental groups are part of the 
impetus for change.  See, e.g., Josh Saks & Jimi Grande, Flood Insurance Vote 
Underscores Need for National Mitigation Strategy | Commentary, ROLL CALL (Apr. 
21, 2014, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.rollcall.com/news/flood_insurance_vote_underscores_need_for_national_mit
igation_strategy-232238-1.html.  Josh Saks is legislative director for the National 
Wildlife Federation, and Jimi Grande is senior vice president of Federal and Political 
Affairs for the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies. 
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In 2014, Congress changed direction, rescinded many reforms, and added 
others, returning in significant part to the solidaristic approach of the 
initial 1968 program.  This Article has explained why the 2012 reforms 
passed and why the 2014 “reforms of the reforms” passed. 
The Article offers recommendations for Congress when it 
reconsiders the NFIP in 2017.  Congress must provide leadership and 
consider the long-term consequences of its actions if the NFIP is going to 
move beyond its current status as a debtor program with, on balance, 
unfortunate consequences.  First, the mapping must be protected from 
political influence.  Second, the solidaristic approach of the general 
subsidies is not based on the need of the recipients or any other 
compelling policy.  So the remaining general subsidies, which have 
lasted decades longer than intended by Congress, need to be phased out.  
The incentives they create to build and fail to replace or renovate older 
properties make little sense; they burden all taxpayers regardless of flood 
risk.  The justification for these enduring subsidies are weaker than in 
other contexts where the federal government has been involved in 
insurance such as riot reinsurance, unemployment insurance, and health 
insurance.  Third, risk-based rates and accurate maps would probably 
bring more private insurance and competition, which likely would be 
better for consumers.  Fourth, Congress should pursue a limited 
solidaristic approach, particularly since the insurance is mandated for 
mortgage holders in flood zones.  To do this, Congress should pass a 
limited means-tested affordability plan linked to mitigation.  Broadly, 
Congress should encourage much more wide dissemination of 
information about flood risk so that it becomes more salient across the 
population.  Finally, ideally, Congress should pass a comprehensive plan 
to deal with floods and other likely consequences of climate change.  
Any of these steps would be an improvement. 
The 2012 and 2014 federal flood insurance reform boomerang can 
be seen as a lesson in practical politics where the real estate industry and 
“vocal, high-risk” constituents451 affected by long overdue reforms 
flexed their muscles and got a result that benefits them financially but 
that costs everyone else and the environment.  Going forward, perhaps 
the increased visibility of the flood insurance issue may prompt a deeper 
analysis and more widespread understanding of the context and history 
of the issues.  The result should be a system that gradually moves 
towards an actuarial approach where rates generally reflect risk, while a 
limited, solidaristic plan assists the truly needy.  There are no simple 
solutions, but Congress could do much better. 
 
 
 451.  Kousky, supra note 425, at 14. 
